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THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN THE NORM LIFE 
CYCLE  
 
     In the last few decades the study of norms coupled with a constructivist approach has brought new 
insights into the area of international relations. The UNGA is the premier global IGO making it an 
important and interesting topic of study in terms of global legislation. This research fills a gap in the 
literature, which does not sufficiently cover the relationship between norms and the UNGA. The case 
studies here yield individual and comparative results which may help to answer broader questions dealing 
with both global governance and international relations. This research finds that the UNGA is able to play 
an influential role in the norm life cycle, which is expanded from Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) 
iteration. The type of issue, the type of promoting state, and the type of state benefiting from the norm all 
seem to play a role in the level of UNGA participation as well as how and when the UNGA participates in 
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      The governance of the international community is a complex and multifaceted problem for 
international relations scholars. Governance takes place on many different levels and is influenced by 
many actors, both state and non-state. The United Nations is perhaps one of the most well-known and 
able international governance providing bodies. Thus, the study of the roles that the United Nations, 
specifically it’s most inclusive body, the General Assembly; play in global governance is interesting as 
well as important in understanding the dynamics of international governance. One of the more common 
ways for international governance to manifest itself is through norms.  
     Norms have more than one definition (Kazetstein 1996, Raymond 1997, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 
and 2001, Sills 2004), but the definition I use here is that norms tell actors (states in this research) how 
they should act (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Norms are not generally able to attain immediate 
acceptance and thus follow several steps to reach internalization in the international community. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) define three steps/phases toward norm acceptance; emergence, cascade, 
and internalization. In this research I have expanded that life cycle to include five distinct steps/phases on 
the path toward normative internalization. The first step is entrepreneurship, in which an actor decides 
that a certain norm should be introduced to the community and attempts to promote the norm in ways that 
push it forward. The second stage is the organizational foothold, in which an organization includes the 
norm on their agenda. The third stage is that of the tipping point; during which actors begin to accept the 
norm. This is followed by the fourth stage, the cascade, in which most actors adopt the norm, at least 
rhetorically, often due to “peer pressure” and/ or citizen pressure. The final stage is that of internalization; 
the completion of this stage requires that actors absorb the norm into their identity and rarely, if ever, 
question it. New norms may eventually be introduced which threaten the existing norm, beginning the 
process over again. These steps are termed a “life cycle” by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) as shown in 





Figure1: Life Cycle Diagram: Detailed Description 
This research wishes to combine the governance provided by norms and the roles played by the United 
Nations General Assembly to discover how they interact. The General Assembly may play a role in each 




Figure 2: Life Cycle Diagram: UNGA Involvement 
Since “norm arguments” are usually not empirically testable, or are at least difficult to test empirically, 
(Eyre and Suchman 1996) my goal is to offer propositions centered on norm and institutional claims. I 
propose that the role of the UNGA may be influenced by the type of state (great power or non-great) and 
the type of issue (i.e.; environmental or weapons) involved in the norm. The juxtaposition of these factors 
may help to tell a story of when and why the UNGA participates in the norm life cycle. I expect that the 
involvement of great powers, due to their desire and ability to act unilaterally and/or with forceful 
persuasion, would decrease the level of participation from the UNGA while norms that benefit non-
greats/ developing countries would show increased participation since these states often rely on public 
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international venues to promote their agendas. I also expect that weapons issues and environmental issues 
will show different levels of involvement, related to the type of state interested in each issue type. 
Therefore I would expect to see less UNGA participation in the life cycle of weapons norms, often 
promoted by great powers, and more UNGA participation in the life cycle of environmental norms which 
often benefit developing countries. 
     Through these propositions I argue for an important role for norms, the General Assembly, and state 
types in international governance. Furthermore, the relationship between these factors is important. 
Though no set “formula” exists to determine the success or failure of norms at the international level, 
practitioners may be able to use this information to determine more efficient modes of approach while 
scholars may use it to understand further the puzzle of international or global governance. The literature 
suggests the need for this research and the possibility for these types of connections. 
     This thesis follows a relatively standard format. I first introduce a review of the relevant literature and 
situate my research within it, as well as develop a conceptual framework within the rest of the thesis rests. 
The literature review covers bodies of literature such as norms, international organizations, and 
international law. The second chapter covers the methods I have used in this thesis. It introduces the 
method of process tracing, explaining why it is an appropriate choice for the type of questions I ask here, 
as well as explaining how process tracing actually works, and the limitations it has. Furthermore the 
methods section covers case selection and the issues associated with it. The next two sections are the meat 
of the thesis, where the process method is actually applied to cases in the weapons and environmental 
arenas. Three norms (cases) appear in each section. As process tracing is applied I begin to relate the 
information learned to my propositions to start making tentative conclusions. The final section is 
conclusions in which all of the cases are brought together and compared and a final assessment of 





II. The UNGA and the Norm Life Cycle 
     The subject matter related to this research and the propositions above cover several separate but related 
bodies of literature. There are good bodies of literature on norms, international organizations, both hard 
and soft law, international regimes, international and customary law, international governance, and the 
United Nations, all well established and frequently studied areas of international relations and 
governance. Perhaps most important to this research are the three areas of norms, the United Nations, and 
international organizations.  
What are Norms: A Definition and a Look at the Life Cycle of Norms 
 
     Norms have several definitions but they all encompass accepted standards that apply to behavior (in 
this case behavior of states) (Goertz 2003). According to Katzenstein (1996), norms may be defined as 
appropriate standards of behavior for certain groups of actors (Risse-Kappen 1996), imply what “ought” 
to be, and often have attached moral assessments (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Norms may define what 
something is, pressure states to act in particular ways, or dis-allow states to act in particular ways 
(Jepperson et al 1996, Katzenstein 1996, Price and Tannenwald 1996, Raymond 1997, Goertz 2003). 
International politics is a social activity and takes place within a certain framework which is defined by 
norms and guidelines (Byers 2008). This means that norms are not born into a vacuum and, when they 
emerge, must contend with existing acceptable terms of behavior; because of this norms go through a 
process Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) term a “life cycle” (see Figures 1 and 2 above).  
     First, norms emerge and are promoted by norm entrepreneurs, who wish the new norm to be 
successful, through use of language and framing (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Payne 2001, Acharya 
2004, Santa-Cruz 2005, Okerake 2008).  Scandinavian countries frequently act as these entrepreneurs 
(Ingebritsen 2002) and during this first stage persuasion is the entrepreneur’s main, if not only, way to 
push the norm forward and onto the “agenda” (Elgstrom 2000). The norm can then gain an 
“organizational foothold” which allows it to be put on the agenda and strengthens the norm itself 
(Kingdon 1995, Finnemore 1996). If norm promoters are successful then norms can reach a “tipping 
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point” at which international pressures serve to cause states to adopt the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998). This can lead to a “norm cascade” in which more and more states adopt the norm (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998) and the norm can be said to have reached “prescriptive status” (Risse and Ropp 1999). 
When the norm is then used frequently, and is integrated into bureaucratic language, it becomes more 
firmly established (Risse-Kappen 1996, Santa-Cruz 2005) through repetition and socialization (Payne 
2001). Finally, if the norm is successful, it becomes internalized by states until a new norm comes along 
to challenge it (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Byers 2008, Gilligan and Nesbitt 2009) The UN General 
Assembly can act as a reflection of state acceptance and internalization (Petersen 2007) and may also act 
as an organizational foothold, among other roles depending on the needs of entrepreneurs/ promoters. 
These steps grant a good lens through which to review important points of norm development and help 
determine when and how the UNGA is participating in norm development through the life cycle process.  
     Goertz generally agrees with this type of life cycle and stresses its non-linearity (Goertz 2003). Norms 
clearly can and do change (Finnemore 1996, Sills 2004), often shocks are the cause of normative change 
and, according to Goertz’s punctuated equilibrium model, norms do not receive much attention for most 
of their life spans (after the internalization stage). There are many reasons norms come into being; goals 
or problems arise, which may be solved by both adopting new norms at the international level (Goertz 
2003) and instituting new regimes to support the new norms (Sills 2004). Problems may be constructed 
by hegemons, epistemic communities, and other groups or individuals leading to the entrepreneurship 
stage of the life cycle. Norms, therefore, can be chosen in a self-interested manner (Goertz 2003, Herrell 
2007) but can still change the way states view their interests over time (Herman 1996, Risse and Sikkink 
1999).  This shows that norms are a viable area of study and occur as a regular phenomenon when global 
changes transpire and new legislation is desired. It makes sense, therefore, that states would attempt to 
influence the resulting new norms in their favor, perhaps using international institutions as a venue of 
influence. Prohibitionary, or proscriptive, norms and regimes may come about for a variety of reasons but 
almost always have a moral component. Global prohibitions regimes exist which have institutionalized 
the proscriptive norms studied here and may or may not be conditional (Nadelmann 1990). Proscriptive 
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norms are a good choice for this thesis because proscriptive norms, while less numerous than prescriptive 
norms, are stronger and less often conditional. This indicates that the internalization phase of the norm 
life cycle must be more complete because violations are clearer and less justifiable. Furthermore, the link 
between those ascribing to proscriptive norms is more intense, making for a stronger connection (Jasso 
and Opp 1997, Shannon 2000). Now that an understanding of norms has been presented the importance of 
norms may be discussed. 
Norm Importance:  
     According to Risse-Kappen norms are “causally consequential in international relations” (p. 365, 
1996). Norms describe the boundaries of what can and should be done in various situations and how 
states should behave (Kowert and Legro 1996, Risse-Kappen 1996, Breitmeier et al. 2006, Hurrell 2007, 
Byers 2008, Hurd 2008, Lake 2008). State actions influence institutions and norms, which then influence 
the creation of new institutions and norms, which influence state actions. This is a mutually constitutive 
process which helps to create state identities and the interpretation of identities and interests (Finnemore 
1996, Katzenstein 1996, Price and Tannenwald 1996, Adler 2007, Hurd 2008). It is even suggested that 
norms help to constitute states themselves to some degree (Jepperson et al. 1996). In this sense 
proscriptive norms help to create identities and define meanings as well as confining state behavior (Price 
1995, Herman 1996, Risse-Kappen 1996, Risse and Sikkink 1999, Adler 2007). However, norms do 
accept the influence of power and self-interest but once internalized are able to influence the behavior of 
both strong and weak states (Santa-Cruz 2005). This is reflected in the propositions, where a 
differentiation of power is a key component. Furthermore, states learn about what their appropriate 
behavior should be from international organizations, as well as other actors, (Shannon 2000) through the 
emulation of institutional norms and also by means of socialization (Adler 2007). Without an 
understanding of state identities state behavior is difficult to predict (Berger 1996). Since norms help to 
constitute state identities a study of them is warranted if predicting state behavior is desirable. The 






     Norms may be viewed on a spectrum from more binding treaties to broad goals (Sills 2004) and also 
on a scale from strong to weak (easily viewed as more or less internalized) (Jepperson et al 1996, Kowert 
and Legro 1996). Norms attain legal status and legitimacy when they are internalized by those which are 
expected to follow them (effected states) (Koh 1997, Sills 2004), this is the “customary” part of 
international law (Risse and Sikkink 1999). “Norms play a crucial role in international law” (Peterson 
2007) because of their relation to customary law which is an important source for determining the rules of 
international relations. If customary law is the root of international law as Kerwin discusses, General 
Assembly resolutions can boost the creation of custom (Schwebel 1979, Joyner 1981, Kerwin 1983). In 
several areas, especially in the environmental and human rights realms, the General Assembly has 
provided non-binding resolutions which expand customary international law (Sills 2004).   “Treaties are a 
major source of international humanitarian law…Another important source is custom” (p. 276 Thakur and 
Maley 1999). This quote shows the importance of both treaty law and customary law in the propagation 
of international norms. Although customary “law” and treaty law are certainly different things, treaties 
may sometimes be able to act as customary law or be a part of a body of custom supporting a specific 
norm, even for states that have not signed, ratified, or participated in the treaty. This is because if a large 
enough consensus of important enough states exists, other nations are compelled to act in certain fashions 
to maintain their constructed images (Bunn 1999).  All of the norms below have been encapsulated within 
a treaty but also have strong customary and moral components backing them up. Arms control is actually 
an act of cooperation between two or more entities, such as states, which could be enemies under some 
future circumstances and usually share some interests (Thakur and Maley 1999).  However, to be 
accepted and effective, norms should be generated using an accepted and appropriate formation process 
(the middle steps of the norm life cycle) and be logically linked to the goals of regimes (Dworkin 1986), 
which are essential since regimes encompass bodies organized to enforce norms in a particular issue area 
(Sills 2004). Impartial and inclusive decision making, which encourages participation, lends legitimacy to 
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norm creation and enforcement (Tyler 1990, Payne 2001). International organizations provide authority 
through which legitimate power can reach states (Herman 1996, Byers 2008, Hurd 2008), offering an 
explanation as to how regimes and international organizations are able to act as efficient norm dispersers 
(Breitmeier et al. 2006, Adler 2007) and explaining why they are targeted at the organizational foothold 
stage and do the most work for the norm in the tipping point and cascade phases of the life cycle. The UN 
is noted as one such body (Hurd 2008). In fact, it has been suggested that UN General Assembly 
declarations should be binding due to the UNGA’s inclusive nature (Peterson 2007). This is an excellent 
reason to make the focus of my research an international organization, such as the UN, that is able to 
provide legitimacy.  
     Many factors can influence norm adoption. Some of the main factors that influence the adoption of a 
norm are the legitimacy of that norm (where/who did it come from), the forcefulness of its promotion 
(first four stages of the life cycle), and the general “moral temper” of the potentially adopting states 
(Okereke 2008). However, even with a relatively high moral temper norms must still be promoted in a 
convincing manner for adoption to occur (Lake 2008, Okereke 2008). Furthermore, acceptance may 
depend upon the issue area in which the norm falls; this is the reason for studying both weapons and 
environmental issues in this thesis. Adoption may be operationalized by measuring degree of 
internalization, determined by the social “density” of the norm i.e.; the number of institutional devices in 
which it is called upon, as discussed by Bernstein(2001, Okereke 2008) and the frequency of violations. 
Okerake also discusses the differentiation between substantive legitimacy (what the norm proposes) and 
procedural legitimacy (who created and who may interpret). The process of norm adoption now being 
understood, an exploration of norms and other entities is required. 
Norms, Regimes, States, Power and Agenda Setting: Norm Building and Dispersal 
 
     Norms are able to provide order, even without the presence of more formal institutions and rules 
(Raymond 1997). However, the presence of regimes helps to strengthen norms and order international 
relations. Regimes are sets of norms, and other directive entities such as rules and procedures, which are 
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influenced by power and act as points of convergence for actors’ expectations (Krasner 1983, 2, 
Katzenstein 1996). Regimes are noted as being distinct from other international phenomena due to their 
normative element. In fact, when norms change, a change of regimes and institutions also occurs 
(Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, Goertz 2003). Regimes have been conceived as “central elements” to 
governance, in which states commit to comply with legally binding rules and norms (Breitmeier et al. 
2006). International organizations are able to strengthen regimes by enhancing the “normatively stabilized 
meanings” at their base (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986), further IOs importance as norm distributors and 
agents. For these reasons I choose two regimes, weapons and environmental, instead of individual norms 
scattered over different regimes. Nadelmann (1990) predicted that different types of weapons; nuclear, 
chemical, etc., and environmental issues; including pollution, species protection, etc. would be some of 
the future regimes; it appears that his prediction was accurate. 
     Norms are operational on a range of levels from individual to global (Price and Tannenwald 1996). 
However, the norms discussed in this thesis are targeted to the state level, meaning that they are adopted 
on a state by state basis. States are often placed at the center of international relations theories and it is at 
the state level that treaties, environmental agreements, etc. are accepted or denied (Lake 2008). Social 
norms at the international level are dependent upon the actions of individual states (Goertz 2003). No 
matter how large, active, or persuasive nongovernmental organizations may be they are able only to 
represent their members and lack the power to force others to action (Lake 2008). 
Why the UNGA? 
     According to Katharina Coleman (2011) “destination venues”, such as conferences with and without 
UN support, independent commissions, and the UNGA, are often targeted by those who desire to push a 
norm forward in the life cycle process. Clearly norm entrepreneurs may choose to act in venues other than 
the UNGA; the WTO, IMF, and other United Nations bodies are all possible avenues, as are regional and 
local venues, depending on what the entrepreneur wants to achieve. Therefore, it is important to explore 
why and when entrepreneurs choose to use the UNGA as the venue. Entrepreneurs may choose the 
UNGA because its resolutions are non-binding, an incentive for state participation. Although this is less 
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desirable than an arena where both binding decisions and high state participation exist, both may be 
difficult, if not impossible, to attain simultaneously and the UNGA may be a good launching platform, or 
place for a venue change when norms stall or fail in other venues depending on how close the norm is to 
its tipping point (Busch 2007, Coleman 2011). The UNGA also offers high levels of international 
socialization and issue linkages due to its inclusive nature and wide variety of issues covered also known 
as a broad venue mandate (Bearce and Bondanella 2007, Coleman 2011). The relative centralization and 
independence (neutrality) of IOs is also a draw for norm entrepreneurs. The UNGA strives for both of 
these factors, making it an appealing forum for norm promotion since state interactions may be facilitated 
along with a reduction of transaction costs. Representation and voting rules, both big parts of the UNGA, 
are important to states, allowing for balance between states with uneven power levels (Abbott and Snidal 
1998).  Venues are also selected depending on the entrepreneurs’ primary goal(s); persuasion and 
negotiation are often both important processes at the beginning of the norm life cycle. Small, consensus 
and deliberation grounded, institutions are generally better for persuasion; while the complexity of norm 
negotiation lends itself more toward larger institutions, often with different voting procedures. The 
UNGA is clearly more geared toward the negotiation side of this coin, but also offers a large audience of 
states which may be persuaded. Legitimacy is likewise a factor when choosing a venue, and established 
venues certainly take precedence over new ones; this is also linked to the legally or politically binding 
nature of the agreements reached by a particular forum and the costs of going back on an agreement 
reached there. The UNGA has a high level of legitimacy, making it a more desirable venue (Coleman 
2011).  
     These factors indicate that the UNGA would be an appropriate venue choice when high levels of state 
participation, negotiation, and legitimacy are desired. I believe that both environmental and weapons issue 
area norms often require these assets in a venue to successfully promote new norms due to their often 
contentious nature. Furthermore, the UNGA could be desirable when issue linkages increase the chances 
of norm adoption. This literature also indicates that UNGA participation could be expected to occur 
starting in the second, or organizational foothold phase, of the norm life cycle but may enter later in the 
12 
 
life cycle when a venue change is effected by entrepreneurs or as a bandwagon member. Institutions, 
such, as the UNGA serve to create a stable environment so that expected results follow interactions 
between actors (Goertz 2003).  
State Type and Norms: 
     Persuasion, socialization, incentives, threats, and force are all mechanisms used by states to promote 
norm acceptance, the choice of promotional mechanism is influenced by the relationship of the promoter 
and the promotee. DeNevers (2007) argues that great powers attempt to coerce weaker states (sometimes 
with force) and persuade stronger states when promoting new norms. This shows the influence that great 
powers may have on the norm acceptance process for other states (Ropp and Sikkink 1999). Great powers 
have superior ability to promote norms because of their ability to agenda set in international forums 
(Nadelmann 1990, Florini 1996, Ingebritson 2002, Barnett and Duvall 2005). Their influence is often 
instrumental in the success of new norms (Schmitz 1999) and can help norms gain a foothold in the 
United Nations (Ropp and Sikkink 1999) although not necessarily required (Jetschke 1999, Risse and 
Ropp 1999).  
     Great powers have long had exceptional influence in the international political arena due to material 
abilities and prestige granted them by other nations (Lake 2008). Indeed, the United States is notorious for 
pushing its policy goals in the UN (Imber 1985). Nonetheless, great states may also be pressured or 
“shamed” into accepting new norms or pressuring smaller states to follow norms by non-state actors 
(Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999) such as the United Nations. This may not always occur due to “power 
based” exceptions to norms, in which those with large amounts of power are exempted from at least some 
of the consequences of norm breaking (Goertz 2003). However, transboundary issues are often more 
likely to become part of a regime. This explains the need to delineate between norms promoted by great 
and non-great powers, giving reason to study the influence of each on the norm life cycle. 
     There is difficulty in determining why nations conform to norms; whether due to belief, pressure or 
state interests (Nadelmann 1990). Normative elements are held by constructivists to be so strong that they 
have the potential to keep any state from continually objecting to or disregarding customary international 
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law (Risse and Sikkink 1999, Byers 2008); this explains why states spend so much effort on influencing 
institutions (Goertz 2003). It also means that less powerful states are able to use international 
organizations to unify and magnify their voice, while great states are able to use their power to agenda set 
within those same institutions. In fact, the group of 77 specifically targeted the General Assembly as a 
way to influence norms to improve equitable distribution of resources (Joyner 1981).  Not much 
investigation has occurred which looks into how power and persuasion may be strategically used to 
“construct” norms (Byers 2008) but the relationship between the two seems to be complex (Finnemore 
1996). Regardless, general norm based prescriptions and proscriptions are more likely to be well received 
than specific rules (Okereke 2008). Furthermore, the type of political system within the state may 
influence how norms are decided upon and/or incorporated (Lake 2008). International law, organizations 
and institutions also influence the norm life cycle. 
International Law, International Organizations, Institutions and Norms:  
 
       Due to constant normative change international lawmaking is a perpetual process. International law 
governs many aspects of daily relations between nations and the citizens of nations. Treaties, customs, 
and precedents define how states and their citizens should act and are often embodied in regimes and 
international organizations such as the United Nations (Byers 2008).The study of international 
organizations attempts, in part, to answer how the international sphere is governed. The answer to this 
question has gone through a lengthy process beginning with the study of formal institutions, followed by 
a focus on institutional processes, and more recently regimes became the focus of international 
organization studies (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). This research 
incorporates international organizations by looking at a central United Nations body. 
     “Institution creation is policy formation at the international level” (Goertz p.169 2003). When states 
agree to policies which provide regulation an institution is created. Institutions provide services and goods 
to those that allow their existence (states in this case) (Goertz 2003). Institutions serve to make 
monitoring easier, decrease uncertainty, increase transparency, and provide more information to policy 
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makers (Katzenstein 1996). The relationship between norms and institutions is undeniable; according to 
Goertz (2003) norms are necessary for institutions to exist (he views institutions as structures of norms) 
and reside in the realm of social context (Finnemore 1996). If regimes are accepted as collections of 
institutions, or the same as institutions (Goertz 2003), the three are intrinsically linked. This study truly 
takes into account norm development and the effect of norms and institutions on state behavior. If the 
development of the norm is not strong enough the norm may not be functional since states will not feel as 
much pressure or desire to consent (Sills 2004), however; even weak norms may be promoted and 
accepted if strong international organizations such as the UN are involved.  
     It is impossible to separate international law from international relations since it is a reflection of 
social practices which produce norms, rules, and procedures (Byers 2008). Essentially norms are “social 
prescriptions” which are reflected in laws and customs and in forming international laws which influence 
international relations and vice versa (Kowert and Legro 1996, Hurrell 2007). International organizations 
play a role in international law as arbitrators and forums of discussion (Byers 2008). Organizations offer 
structure and clarity, institutions can produce norms of varying strength which apply to varying situations, 
or universally. Organizational actions can be understood as making decisions based upon norms. 
Organizations can be conceived of as unitary actors; although there may not be total agreement in 
decisions, organizations do make clear choices about which norms/ policies they adopt and utilize (Goertz 
2003). Thus the power that organizations such as the UN have is comparatively large, this can be seen 
when states first resist a norm or law by taking surface action and using rhetoric about integration and 
acceptance to retain or rise in status internationally, then later concede due to pressure from an 
international organization and truly internalizing norms (Black 1999, Byers 2008). International 
institutions are sets of norms followed by states wishing to be included in the set of “civilized” states 
(Goertz 2003) one example is the differentiation between states willing to use chemical weapons 
(uncivilized) and those unwilling to do so (civilized) (Nadelmann 1990, Price and Tannenwald 1996) 
another is the way states treat their citizens (Herman 1996). Standing may be vulnerable if actors are 
accused of disregarding norms important to the community (Barnett 1996). Because the “community” in 
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this research is state focused, it is appropriate to select an international organization rather than one at 
lower levels such as local or regional. 
     International organizations have a mutually constitutive relationship with state (and actor) preferences. 
From this statement the conclusion may be drawn that norms move both from states to institutions and 
from institutions to states (Keohane 1998), an essential part of my argument. This is because ideal 
institutional function occurs when states follow the institutional norms and receive benefits; when norms 
are not followed sanctions are often put into place (Goertz 2003). This relationship acts like a 
conversation between states and institutions. The UN is important in many of the areas discussed above, 
the further discussion of its involvement is beneficial for this thesis. 
United Nations General Assembly Contributions: 
 
    The very existence of the UN proves the existence of international society (Byers 2008), a society from 
which norms may be constructed and emerge to affect state behavior. The United Nations makes an 
optimal case study for looking at the relationship between international organizations and norms. One 
reason for this is that the UN is possibly the only universal body that is able to set norms which are 
accepted globally (Sills 2004) another is that the UNGA embodies the idea of international diplomacy, 
due to its global town hall meeting atmosphere, (Keohane 1998) and diplomatic activities often center 
around, and are influenced by norms. The UN has many options available when it comes to influencing 
and dispersing norms; it can support new norms by acting as an organizational foothold, tinker with 
existing ones, and expand regimes supporting norms (Sills 2004). The difficulty of creating global norms 
is clear (due, in part, to the influence of individual cultures on norms) putting the UN in a unique position 
(Sills 2004). Furthermore, the UN is known to assist in lowering transaction costs and making difficult 
agreements possible (Keohane 1998), this is an important element since weapons and environmental 
issues are notoriously contentious. It is for these reasons that Joyner (1981) states that the General 
Assembly has directly influenced international law, in part because states are able to meet and discuss 
international issues (Joyner 1981, Sills 2004). Also, several norms have been shown to get their push to 
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acceptance in the General Assembly (Joyner 1981), reflecting the tipping point and cascade phases of the 
norm life cycle. The General Assembly has a special place in norm creation, the importance of and level 
of participation in this body indicates that its decisions should be taken as guidelines for state behavior 
and interaction, even though the resolutions are nonbinding (Sills 2004). 
     Early in international relations studies it was determined that United Nations is activity involved the 
establishment of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Although the UN has had a hand in the formation 
and signing of many international treaties its influence goes beyond that (Sills 2004), United Nations 
General Assembly resolutions can serve as a sort of normative international law (Schwebel 1979). In the 
sixty years after the Second World War the United Nations initiated over 500 multilateral agreements, 
often dealing with newly recognized and increasingly global problems such as the environment and 
terrorism (Sills 2004). General Assembly resolutions particularly offer hope in areas that are more 
difficult to deal with as they offer a soft law option which, although not legally binding, may become 
internalized (Kerwin 1983). The UN also holds global conferences which bring leaders together to discuss 
world issues. These conferences can increase the salience of an issue by bringing media attention, and can 
produce strong norms (Sills 2004). Perhaps these conferences work in tandem with the General Assembly 
to strengthen and disperse new or struggling norms. 
     The UN is also able to act as a legitimate norm originator because it is seen as a relatively authoritative 
and impartial body (Ropp and Sikkink 1999, Okerake 2008), factors which enhance norm legitimacy 
(Franck 1988). Also, the UN may sometimes be seen as more legitimate than other norm promoting actors 
including other international governmental organizations (IGO’s) (Jetschke 1999). This explains why 
resolutions often lead to conventions and treaties which are more binding (Sills 2004). The UN has the 
unique body of the International Law Commission (ILC), which is charged with the creation of draft 
treaties in subject areas deemed important by the UNGA or the ILC. When draft treaties are completed 
the General Assembly convenes member states to sign the treaty. Several treaties and conventions which 
were once General Assembly resolutions have come into being, some examples include; the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, treaties covering the use of outer space and the sea bed, and nuclear non-
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proliferation (Sills 2004). The Declaration of Human Rights actually achieved normative status as part of 
the General Assembly’s incorporation of it into other declarations (Thomas 1999). Due to the role the UN 
plays as a global organization and its organizational culture (norms, values, knowledge, etc.) the UN has 
influence on member states’ perceptions and actions (Kier 1996), making it an ideal target for norm 
focused research.  
     The United Nations has actually undertaken the study of norms for the Common Heritage of Mankind 
(CHM) in which the UN formed a committee to discover which norms may help promote seabed 
endeavors to reflect CHM (Okereke 2008). The UN often mediates normative claims and structures 
discourse (Finnemore 1996). This literature can help gain understanding of what norms are and how they 
are built and dispersed through international organizations. Since the United Nations acts as both a 
significant disperser and receptacle of norms, it seems appropriate to use its deliberative body, the 
General Assembly, as a model for studying this phenomenon. I hope to discover what roles the General 
Assembly plays in the norm life-cycle. This discovery can be but a small step in answering the age old 
question of international relations scholar’s; how does governance occur at the international level? 
Conclusion: 
 
     The fact that ideas matter in international and global politics is no longer a cutting-edge idea, research 
now needs to discern how and why ideas are important and what causal mechanisms can help norms 
change state practices and identities (Risse and Ropp 1999). This research seeks to find some links in the 
causal chain, specifically what role the United Nations General Assembly can play in bringing norms to 
states. The approaches to finding an answer to the question of how norms, international organizations, and 
states are related are as numerous and potentially contentious as the views on the importance of norms. 
This task is not be easy for as Petersen (2007) states that there are no clear guidelines to help researchers 
identify customary norms, perhaps the methods section can help to untangle some of the procedural 





     For this research I use the general idea of the case comparative model which identifies the presence or 
absence of conditions which may account for the relationship between norms, the General Assembly, and 
states, to attempt to identify possible conditions that account for the phenomenon so that the selected 
variable can be determined as necessary, sufficient, or neither for the occurrence of the relationship 
(Lofland et al 2006, Roselle and Spray 2007). In looking at a specific institution some causes may be 
neither necessary nor sufficient but instead offer possibilities for phenomena to occur, as is consistent 
with constructivist research. Weiss (1994) states that “the demonstration of causation rests heavily on the 
description of a visualizable sequence of events, each event flowing into the next”, I rely heavily upon 
this statement in answering my research questions, especially since I am using process tracing in an 
attempt to understand the causality of this process. As with many governance processes there is no 
assumption of linearity, cases are presented in this way to preserve clarity. I desire to find the causal 
“chain” and “mechanism” linking the independent variables to the outcome or dependent variables 
(George and Bennett 2005, Steinberg 2007).  
     Process tracing is appropriate for this thesis because I ask how something occurs. Looking at the 
history of a norm, which can be accomplished through process tracing, can be an effective way to 
overcome the shortcomings of deductive approaches (Price 1995). Perhaps more importantly process 
tracing may be the only method of use in moving past covariation to determine causal processes (George 
and Bennett 2005). Process tracing allows for full description and analysis which is not possible with 
quantitative methods (Steinberg 2007) by using inferences, something which quantitative research often 
lacks (Bennett and George 1997, Collier 2011). One of the major reasons I am using process tracing in 
this thesis is to bolster causal conjectures for my small n study (Collier 2011) which is allowed through in 
depth study and inferences it allows. 
What is Process Tracing?:  
          Process tracing is a multi-functional approach which can offer insight into many areas of research 
such as confirming or discovering new hypotheses, identifying and describing new phenomena (social 
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and political), understanding and assessing causal mechanisms, and acting as an alternative to attacking 
difficult problems (Bennett and George 1997, George and Bennett 2005, Collier 2011). Process tracing 
may be explained as a historical approach to looking at the development of frames used to interpret 
actions and potential actions, in this thesis those related to norms (Jepperson et al. 1996).  For example, 
the norm life cycle, developed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), may be used as a frame to explore the 
process of norm development for the chemical weapons norm and to look at what role the UNGA plays. 
In short process tracing is a type of “analytic narrative” which usually stresses the temporal aspect of 
events (Collier 2011) in order to fully grasp what actors/actions are important and when. This fits with, 
and provides a strong methodological base for, the case study approach and many theoretical approaches, 
including constructivism (Bennett and George 1997, Snidal 2007, Steinberg 2007). 
    Process tracing may also be viewed as an “operational procedure” used to analyze and discover causal 
mechanisms (Bennett and George 1997, George and Bennett 2005, Steinberg 2007) and may help 
determine whether correlations are causal by linking outcomes with causal mechanisms. More than one 
possible causal path or indeterminate theories lead to trouble with process tracing, making theory 
confirmation provisional at best (Bennett and George 1997), but it is an apt method for the development 
of conditional generalizations about the circumstances under which specific causal paths are followed 
(George and Bennett 2005).  Causal mechanisms are unobservable causal processes and variables through 
which causal or explanatory variables produce causal effects in an attempt to change some entity, and 
should follow an continual path from cause to effect (Bennett and George 1997, George and Bennett 
2005) making them required but not always adequate to explain phenomena. Process tracing allows the 
analysis of causal claims through an examination and description of historical events and political 
phenomena, including intervening variables (Bennett and George 1997, Collier 2011).  
Process Tracing in this Thesis: 
     The methods of this thesis are aimed toward a general explanation of the role that the UNGA plays in 
the norm life cycle. This is appropriate due to the nature of the propositions and the desire to produce 
some generalizability. I use process tracing as a verification method (Bennett and George 1997), applying 
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Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm life cycle and assessing my own theories dealing with the role of 
the United Nations’ General Assembly in shaping that process. This type of question clearly invites a 
more qualitative, rather than quantitative approach as do many of the more amorphous concepts 
international relations studies. For this reason I focus on explaining the qualitative methods which would 
best lend themselves to the questions posed in this thesis. 
     Since norms can be assessed only in relation to human minds it is difficult to “measure” them in any 
precise manner, such as with an index (Nadelmann 1990, Kowert and Legro 1996, Raymond 1997). To 
overcome some of these obstacles Raymond (1997) recommends using public documents, legal treatises, 
and behavioral events as data sources when studying norms. The sources I use are document based; 
including the treaties which encapsulate the norms studied here, time lines and histories put together by 
supporting organizations, and many secondary sources. I believe the research is viable if only document 
sources are utilized, especially since the treaty texts reference previous documents influencing the norms 
such as other treaties, agreements, and decisions. This offers insight into the norms beyond the treaty 
itself. However, the research would be enriched by the inclusion of interviews and observations which 
could be undertaken in a future research project.  
     If institutions are collections of norms and decision making procedures then norms included in the 
institution are also explicitly accepted when treaties are signed. I limited my research to norms formalized 
in institutions through treaties or conventions, which helps establish clearer, easier to analyze cases 
(Goertz 2003), therefore; the norms are the individual cases, however; each is encapsulated within a treaty 
or convention. Institutions are created when policy agreements between states are explicit. Goertz 
indicates that an appropriate measure of explicitness would be the signing of a treaty. Sills agrees that 
treaties are important calling them both “concrete” and “understandable” compared to other forms of 
norm embodiment (2004). A treaty must be signed by a “significant proportion” of affected states. This 
makes it clear that usually several, but not all states must participate in a treaty for norms to be considered 
valid. This does not mean that treaty signing must occur for a norm to be considered effective; only that if 
treaties which encapsulate said norm do not have a relatively high rate of participation then the likelihood 
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is that the norm is not accepted or internalized by many state actors. This is important since the United 
States is notorious both as a hegemonic actor and one who often refuses or refrains from signing treaties 
creating new institutions.  
     Collier (2011) stresses the need for accurate description of the process at specific points which is 
facilitated by the norm life cycle due to its indication of key points which merit this type of careful 
description. I use the norm life cycle as diagnostic evidence to pinpoint which specific points of the cases 
should be analyzed, and make causal inferences such as the role of the UNGA in norm propagation. 
Diagnostic evidence relies on prior knowledge, in this case, that of recurring empirical regularities 
described by the stages of the norm life cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Collier 2011). Tables have 
been created indicating key points in the norm life cycle, the points at which the UNGA is involved, the 
issues involved, and the type of state involved. Then a comparison of this information is undertaken in an 
attempt to provide information on each case to analyze my propositions. The propositions may be 
strengthened if UNGA involvement in the norm life cycle is influenced by state type and/or issue type. 
For example, if great state participation is high and UNGA participation is low this would support my 
expectations. Furthermore, if the issue is weapons based I expect a different level of involvement from the 
UNGA than for environmental issues.  
Variables/Operationalization: 
     Process tracing is an appropriate tool for the study of a minimal number of variables and can help 
determine if a singular variable may or may not be excluded from the causal chain by determining its 
necessity in the stated outcome. Types of states are divided into two categories; great powers, as defined 
by Handel (1990) to be a combination of nuclear, military, economic, technical, resources and other types 
of power as well as large populations and territory such as the United States, the EU, China, and Russia 
and less powerful, non-great powers such as Algeria, Cambodia, and Lebanon; these distinctions are 
usually discussed in the literature. General Assembly participation is matched with the each stage of the 
norm life cycle in which it appears (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In dealing with alternative 
explanations I try to exclude the possibility of intervening variables by making every effort to recognize 
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them and discredit them as part of the process (Lofland et al. 2006) and using a form of covariation to 
decrease the likelihood that intervening variables are causing the phenomena suggested by my 
propositions (Bennett and George 1997, Steinberg 2007, Collier 2011). Thus, the theory or proposition 
becomes more developed as the research proceeds (George and Bennett 2005) and the understanding of 
the phenomenon may change (George and Bennett 2005).  
     For the purposes of this thesis the stages of the norm life cycle are operationalized as follows: During 
the entrepreneurial stage an actor is promoting the norm. Promotion is occurring when the entrepreneur is 
attempting to raise awareness of an issue, especially by getting it on organizations' agendas, often with the 
use of persuasive techniques. This stage occurs before or simultaneously with the organizational foothold 
stage. During the organizational foothold stage the norm is put on the agenda of an organization/ 
organizations. It is evident that this has occurred when organizations speak on the subject/ make 
statements about the norm, often with the UNGA this is most easily seen through resolutions. During the 
tipping point either great states, states impacted by the norm, or a few states are promoting and/or have 
adopted the norm. This is the least defined period by Finnemore and Sikkink and they state that it is 
difficult to determine that this stage is occurring until after the cascade stage is reached. This stage must 
occur prior to the cascade phase and may overlap with the organizational foothold stage. During the 
cascade phase most or all of impacted states are on board/ have adopted the norm. This is most easily 
characterized by the signing and ratification of a treaty in my cases. During the internalization stage few, 
if any, violations of the norm occur; those that do offer justification for actions. By this point violations of 
the norm are seen as poor or unacceptable behavior by other actors. Table 1 below shows the 
operationalization of the norm life cycles and the thresholds for UNGA participation at each phase. These 
stages may be applied to specific cases, using a case comparative method, the explanation of comparative 






Table 1: Operationalization of Norm Life Cycle Stages and UNGA Involvement Thresholds 








Promotion is occurring 
when the entrepreneur is 
attempting to raise 
awareness of an issue,  
The UNGA 
would be 




consist of the UNGA 
being the first actor to 
promote the norm. 
Organizational Foothold:  In 
this stage an organization (or 
organizations) become "second 
stage" norm entrepreneurs, 
promoting the norm and placing 
it on their agenda. 
It is evident that this has 
occurred when 
organizations speak on the 
subject/ make statements 
about the norm, or when 
discussion of the subject 
occurs in the organization. 
The UNGA 
would be 
involved in this 
stage if it acted 




the norm.  
The norm is on the 
agenda of the UNGA. 
The UNGA is 
discussing issues 
related to the norm; 
they may also produce 
a resolution or 
declaration as a result. 
Tipping Point: This stage is 
reached when enough states 
have joined to push the norm 
toward the cascade stage.  
Empirically about 1/3 of 
states constitutes a tipping 
point. However, this is not 





prior to the 
cascade phase.  
This may be clear if 
states start adopting 
the norm in close 
juxtaposition with a 
UNGA resolution or 
declaration.  
Cascade Phase: More states 
begin to join, including those 
with little or no domestic 
pressure to do so.  
Most or all states have 
adopted the norm, at least 
on the surface. This is most 
easily seen by the signing 
of a treaty (or later 
ascension).  
Same as above 
but occurring 
during the 
cascade phase.  
Treaties with high 
participative 
percentages, or which 
gain significant 
numbers after UNGA 
involvement are good 
indicators. 
Internalization: Norms are 
incorporated into everyday 
activities, procedures, and 
interactions. They are "taken for 
granted" at this point. 
Violations of the norm are 
not acceptable to the 
broader international 
community and often bring 
repercussions. Also, actors 
who break the norm offer 
justifications.  
The UNGA is 




The UNGA may 
pressure states with 
incentives or 
disincentives such as 
embargos, blockades, 





Comparative Methods and Case Selection:  
         Comparative methods represent a non-statistical study of a small number of cases and may be 
supplemented by or supplement process tracing methods very successfully (George and Bennett 2005). 
The process tracing approach generally takes place within one case but may be multi-case if specific 
points are analyzed (Bennett and George 1997, George and Bennett 2005, Steinberg 2007, Collier 2011). 
Odell (2001) indicates that dividing a process into steps and then applying it to a particular case (or set of 
cases) could add extra discipline and more “convincing” case comparison could result, allowing more 
generalizable patterns. An increased number of cases can help to determine singular or varying causal 
paths for the phenomena under examination (Bennett and George 1997). Goertz insists upon tracking 
policies from infancy for a “significant period”, preferably the entire life cycle of the policy/ norm (2003), 
indicating the need for in-depth study of a small number of cases. A case study is an example of a specific 
type of event or phenomenon (George and Bennett 2005); in my thesis this type of event is the process of 
norm development. As already stated case selection is essential to case study and process tracing 
methods. In this thesis I chose six cases that are instances of the prohibition norms and apply the norm 
life cycle described by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). In this way I can discover if the activities of the 
General Assembly are important to states (and their representatives, or leaders) in terms of norm 
promotion and how involvement may be influenced.  
     Three cases from the environmental area and three from the weapons area were chosen to give a more 
comprehensive look at the two areas of interest and represent several different weapons and 
environmental issues over a span of several decades. I chose several cases in the selection process varying 
on the spectrum of most likely (chemical weapons norm) with great powers interested and benefiting, 
with little participation from UNGA; to least likely (oil pollution at sea norm) with a great power 
promoting but beneficiary states of both types, which demonstrated UNGA involvement and the 
entrepreneurship and engagement of different types of countries at different stages of the norm life cycle.  
     I focus on one type of norm to decrease the number of variables and chose to study proscriptive norms, 
which prevent states from taking certain types of actions, for example, the use of chemical weapons or the 
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release of oil at sea are prohibited by norms. The focus on proscriptive norms was chosen because 
proscription seems to require more governance than norms which allow state actions, since state behavior 
is expected to change. Two sub categories of proscriptive norms were chosen, those which confine 
weapons use and those which deal with environmental issues. These two selections were made since 
weapons and environmental issues affect most if not all states in the UN system and are often contested 
issues within that system, making instances of UNGA involvement more likely, since the UN often deals 
with these types of issues. The UNGA has specific bodies that deal with weapons and environmental 
issues, the First and Second Committees, respectively (UN News Center 2012). Furthermore I selected 
issues I believed would be “vulnerable” to normative pressures, the actions associated with these issues 
are difficult to conceal, require difficult to get and/or expensive materials, or require some expertise, 
although the oil pollution norm probably fits these qualities the least. However, all of the norms selected 
here arguably have some type of moral/ethical or emotional component making them more likely to 
receive support (Nadelmann 1990). Although this process may seem clear there are some issues with this 
approach, and area of study. 
Opposing/ Alternative Arguments and Limitations: 
 
     Of course all scholars do not agree on these matters and there are several views on the importance of 
norms and the role of the General Assembly. Keohane (1988) makes it clear that norms are not necessary 
for international cooperation to take place. However, this is not in direct conflict with my argument since 
my interest is in discovering the connection between the General Assembly and norms, not arguing that 
norms are necessary and/or sufficient for international cooperation. Others argue that the breaking of 
norms devalues them (Sills 2004) but the action of states breaking norms does not mean that they do not 
exist (Goertz 2003). Still other critics posit that constructivists put too much of their argument on 
changing identities that do not change often (Adler 2007). Even if this is true it does not detract from my 
argument which states that the UN General Assembly may have a role when norms do change or new 
norms are introduced.  
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     There is no clear agreement on how norms should be detected, measured, or even studied (Jepperson et 
al 1996). It is important to remember that norms can be found by looking at the consistent behavior of 
states (Hurrell 2007). Norms may at times be thought weak because they are non-binding; however, that 
does not make them unimportant (Joyner 1981). Indeed, IR scholars accept that binding obligations are 
not enough on their own to explain state behavior (Finnemore and Toope 2001). Fault can be found with 
previous studies on norms, especially due to case selection bias of positive cases by scholars (Legro 
1997); furthermore there are arguments that not enough attention is given to “norm-takers” and too much 
to “norm-makers”. (Kowert and Legro 1996, Checkel 1999). Another possible issue is the UN’s 
reluctance to become involved with “domestic” issues but Santa-Cruz (2005) shows if there is enough 
interest then it can be persuaded to do so. Of course criticism goes even deeper than these examples, as 
some scholars argue against the idea of a national interest existing at all since politics affect groups 
differently; even if this criticism is accepted, state-centric theories are useful when understanding 
international relations. Additionally the concept of “freeriding” occurs with normative efforts 
(environmental initiatives such as greenhouse gas emissions for example) (Lake 2008).  
     Qualitative methods showed general decline in use after the Second World War but have picked up 
again over the past few years due to a strengthening in structure and a systematic, rigorous approach to 
qualitative methods such as process tracing used in conjunction with case studies. The same can be said 
for case study methods which have gone in and out of favor but are more rigorous when coupled with 
process tracing and may allow for narrow to mid-level generalizations (George and Bennett 2005). Case 
studies may suffer from a lack of indeterminacy and shaky conclusions. Although selection bias may be a 
problem for case study methods, it has less impact than bias in statistical methods and case studies 
selected upon the dependent variable may provide valid and important information on the necessity and 
sufficiency of variables. Furthermore, selections made with prior knowledge of cases allow for stronger 
research design and process tracing can help guard against the issues connected with selection bias; over 
confirmation of propositions is still a possibility and cases with more easily accessible evidence are also a 
source of selection bias (George and Bennett 2005). 
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     Process tracing is an extremely useful method but cannot be seen as a panacea for theory testing and 
development. It may generate data and prove spuriousness as well as discover unaccounted for variables 
but suffers greatly when data is lacking or misinterpreted. It may only reach full predictive capacity if 
every step in the causal chain is studied and an uninterrupted path is both observed and proven. When 
process tracing only looks at a smaller number of variables, only provisional conclusions may be reached. 
Furthermore, when turning historical narratives into analytical ones some richness and uniqueness of 
cases may be lost (George and Bennett 2005), this is an acceptable trade off which allows for 
generalization (Roselle and Spray 2011). I attempt to overcome bias by including primary documents, 
allowing me to draw my own conclusions and verify the claims of some secondary documents. I know 
that the bias of interest still remains, if the authors who wrote the secondary sources I used were not 
interested there would likely be no correlating document, but hope that the well rounded selections 
decrease other forms of bias. In doing this I also hope to minimize my personal bias by exposing myself 
to varied opinions and perspectives, process tracing itself also lends a hand in minimizing personal bias 
since it is difficult to force history into a certain shape or path (George and Bennett 2005).  
        The United Nations, especially the UNGA, has been instrumental in promoting, adopting, and 
placing weapons norms at the forefront. This involvement varies from norm to norm on a continuum from 
very little involvement, to extremely involved. The timing of the UNGA’s participation also varies, as 
may be seen from the cases below. I expect to see General Assembly involvement in each norm in 
varying degrees depending on who is promoting the norm and what type of issue it is. I also expect that 
involvement is related to the success of the norms in that they move forward in the norm life cycle after 
involvement occurs. Now that the methods of assessment have been discussed the next two sections will 







IV. Process Tracing Norms Through Weapons Treaties 
“[T]he cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and place in a 
system of purposes, lie worlds apart; whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again 
and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power 
superior to it…However well one has understood the utility of a physiological organ (or of a legal 
institution, a social custom, a political usage, a form in art or in a religious cult), this means 
nothing regarding its origin…the entire history of a "thing," an organ, a custom, can in this way 
be a continuous sign- chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even 
have to be related to one another … The form is fluid, but the "meaning" is even more so” 
(Nietzsche 1887). 
 
     In the first part of this chapter each selected weapons norm is evaluated on an individual basis, 
investigating the process by which the specific prohibitionary norm came about, and was encapsulated in 
treaty form. This individual analysis pays close attention to the role of the United Nations General 
Assembly in the life cycle of each norm. After the three weapons norms have been explored and analyzed 
individually, in the next section, they are searched for similarities and differences in the role of the 
UNGA and state types in the norm life cycle which may help to draw conclusions about the norms as a 
group and allow for predictions relating to the broader group of weapons norms and or treaties.  
     In this section I look at three prominent and relatively successful norms focused on weapons bans. The 
first is the anti-landmine norm, encapsulated within the Ottawa Treaty, an important weapons norm 
treaty, especially since it was the first in over one hundred years to ban a major weapons system, which 
had widespread use by many countries, outright, instead of just regulating it, and also has high levels of 
state participation (Conference Statements 1997, Thakur and Maley 1999, Anderson 2000). The Ottawa 
Treaty, fully titled the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of 





 1997 (Mine Ban Treaty Text 1997, Ottawa Landmines Convention 1997, Thankur 
and Maley 1999). The second norm is that opposing the use of chemical weapons and is encapsulated in 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, fully titled The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, and on Their Destruction, also offers a 
proscriptive norm to study. This treaty focuses on the banishment of chemical weapons and is built 
around strong norms which proscribe the use of such weapons. The final norm in this section is the 
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nuclear test-ban norm, captured within the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty which seeks to end 
the use of Nuclear weapons. All three of these norms are part of a larger disarmament regime which has 
been instrumental since the height of the Cold War. These norms have various rates of participation from 
great powers, especially the United States, making them interesting in terms of my propositions.   
Anti-Personnel Land Mines 
     The Ottawa Treaty encapsulates a norm that prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of 
anti-personnel land mines; the treaty also provides guidelines on the destruction of these mines. The treaty 
defines an anti-personnel land mine as being “designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or 
contact, of a person” and is intended to “incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons” (Ottawa Treaty 
Text 1997). Other norms are also included within the Ottawa Treaty; there is a strong general norm 
present of not accepting civilian targeting weapons. The Ottawa Conference also recognizes that anti-
personnel landmines could negatively affect economic development and the repatriation and aid to 
refugees, both of which are hindrances to norms which promote economic development and protection of 
refugee groups (Conference Statements 1997).  
     The Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 are at the core of many arms reduction and control 
measures and focus on the effects war has on both soldiers and civilians, such as the effect of landmines 
on civilians. Anti-personnel landmines are a prime target for proscriptive norms since they affect civilians 
so broadly and indiscriminately, killing more civilians than soldiers (80-90% of anti-personnel landmine 
fatalities are civilians), and often killing innocents long after the end of the conflict (Thakur and Maley 
1999, UN News Center 2007). The number of deaths caused by landmines is estimated to be up to 20,000 
plus yearly.  With only one mine cleared for every twenty laid during several years of conflict (post world 
War Two throughout the 1990s) the numbers of potentially deadly or maiming mines were increasing at a 
staggering rate. These reasons are some of the many that the plethora of participating governments gave 
for their support of the Ottawa Treaty (Conference Statements 1997, UN News Center 2007). 
Furthermore, a study conducted by the International Red Cross found that anti-personnel land mines 
rarely, if ever, affect the ultimate outcome of a conflict (Thakur and Maley 1999). 
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     The treaty also recognizes the independent actions of states which had already taken unilateral, 
bilateral, and multilateral steps toward the eradication of anti-personnel mines, and particularly the work 
of NGOs, such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent and the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL), which acted as entrepreneurs and organizational footholds; as well as Princess Diana 
and Kofi Annan who also acted as norm entrepreneurs, subsequently leading to the involvement of the 
UN (Ottawa Treaty Text 1997, Conference Statements 1997). Anderson (2000) echoes the importance of 
these groups, even stating that NGOs, such as the Red Cross and Crescent organizations, were entirely 
responsible for beginning this effort to ban land mines and influential in its ultimate success. He also 
states that although the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was the true entrepreneur of the 
effort, marking the first stage of the norm life cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (made up of various other NGOs) and its citizen’s campaign really helped 
bring the issue to center stage (Thakur and Maley 1999, ICBL Website 2012). The Ottawa Treaty text 
also names the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament as especially important in the quest to 
end the threat of anti-personnel mines (Ottawa Treaty Text 1997). Anderson, (2000), argues that global 
transnational elites also had a large role in bringing this norm to legislation.  
     The preamble of the treaty recognizes several preceding documents which played a part in the 
culmination of the anti-personnel land mine norm being captured within the treaty; several parts of the 
weapons regime played a part in the norm life cycle. One early version of this norm recognized by the 
Treaty is the Protocol on Prohibitions of Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices which was amended May 3
rd
 1996 and annexed to the more inclusive Convention on the 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Ottawa Treaty Text 1997). The Ottawa Treaty 
text also welcomes United Nations General Assembly resolution 51/45 S which came during the cascade 
phase between the May 3
rd
 1996 Protocol and the treaty signing in December 1997, and urges states to 
take steps toward the creation of an international agreement to ban anti-personnel land mines which is 
effective and binding (Conference Statements 1997, Ottawa Treaty Text 1997).  
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     The United States has chosen not to participate in the Ottawa Treaty, partially due to dissatisfaction 
with authentication measures which are not independently verifiable, (Thakur and Maley 1999), despite 
promises to join by 2006. Neither Russia or China, two other great states, are signatories; yet, the treaty is 
still deemed successful. This could be puzzling, as the United States is often thought to bring legitimacy, 
to international treaties (Anderson 2000). However, according to my expectations, the norm life cycle 
does not necessitate the cooperation or participation of great powers. This is reinforced by Thakur and 
Maley’s (1999) discussion on state’s fear of disapprobation, even for states who do not formally 
participate in the Ottawa Treaty. It is also of note that, at the beginning of this process (entrepreneurship 
and organizational foothold stages); governments were generally uninterested in participation and 
unconvinced of the viability of a universal ban. However, some governments were sympathetic to the 
issue and passed unilateral measures designed to decrease landmine threat leading to the tipping point. 
The importance of states acting unilaterally or in small groups before the norm became encapsulated in 
the treaty, during the tipping point and beginning of the cascade phases, was clear in this process. In 1995 
Austria was one of the first countries to seriously pursue a total ban on anti-personnel landmines and 
destroy all of its stock, it was also the state which provided the treaty draft.  In 1996 Australia also 
committed to a total anti-personnel landmine ban and explicitly suspended the use of landmines, shortly 
thereafter several other eastern European states such as Bulgaria and Croatia as well as African states 
such as Mozambique made similar commitments to the campaign. It was beneficial to the movement that 
the effort to ban landmines did not pose a threat to the economic viability of arms manufacturing 
companies, avoiding a potentially adverse movement from such powerful entities (Conference Statements 
1997, Anderson, 2000).  
     The pressure of NGOs during the tipping point and cascade phases, especially the ICBL, led a 
sufficient group of significant states to endorse the norm/ treaty, therefore, the core principles of the ban 
did not have to be compromised to achieve some measure of success and the participating entities chose 
to adopt a policy of little to no compromise when gaining more members/ supporters (Conference 
Statements 1997, Anderson 2000). The thinking in taking this approach was that only including “like-
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minded” states in the treaty would build a stronger norm and still eventually lead to more states joining as 
their opinions changed over time due to the influence of norms and the pressure of participating states and 
NGOs (Conference Statements 1997, Anderson, 2000); something that has proven true so far. These 
actions convinced states to begin passing measures and led to the cascade phase of the norm life cycle 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Thakur and Maley (1999) emphasize the ability of humanitarian inspired 
international law to “evolve” through the participation and consensus of the adherent states while not 
requiring the consent of every state. In 1997 several conferences were held relating to the draft treaty. As 
states agreed to the text of the treaty other states that might not have initially been seen as “like minded” 
also begin to warm to the treaty, causing a cascade of supporting states, an important step in the norm life 
cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).  
     The ICBL statement made at the Ottawa Conference makes clear the importance of state support and 
the leadership of states such as Canada, Belgium, Norway, Austria and others (Conference Statements 
1997). Therefore, the lack of US participation is no great loss to the treaty since its values would have to 
be overly compromised to meet US demands and garner American participation. It is interesting to note 
that the majority of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the US, Russia and China, have 
not signed the treaty (ICBL Website 2012) which could indicate an aversion to signing the Ottawa Treaty 
or possibly an effort to balance each other in terms of power. 
     Non-signatories such as Cuba, Finland, and Israel made statements recognizing the importance of 
banning anti-personnel land mines and offered varied reasons for their decision not to sign the treaty, 
indicating that the norm was relatively strong and at least partially internalized since non-participants felt 
compelled to explain their lack of involvement (Conference Statements 1997). In 1997 the UNGA 
adopted a resolution proposed by the Ottawa Conference with 156 positive votes, no negative votes and 
ten abstaining votes (Thakur and Maley 1999). Aside from its original resolution 51/45 the UNGA also 
has yearly resolutions supporting the Ottawa Treaty, supporting the norm in its internalization phase. It is 
interesting to note that China has voted in favor several times in the last decade indicating a chance for 
further internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Landmine Monitor Report 2009). The cascade of 
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the norm has grown and now includes most states recognized by the United Nations; as of September 
2011 one hundred fifty-nine states were party to the Ottawa Treaty while two more had signed but had not 
yet ratified, thirty-five further UN recognized states were non-signatories meaning that 82% of UN 
recognized states had signed the treaty (ICBL Website, 2012). The Ottawa Treaty entered into force in 
1999 after the required forty state ratifications was reached.  
     The Ottawa Treaty on Land Mines is an effort to encapsulate and promote the norm proscribing the 
use of anti-personnel land mines. The anti-personnel land mine norm provided interesting results when 
process tracing methods were applied. While this case is based on a security/ weapons issue non-
governmental organizations played a large role in bringing it to the forefront. States in general were 
uninterested before the tipping point but mostly non-great states participated during or before that stage. 
The primary benefiting state type is non-greats since most landmines are found in developing countries 
which lack the resources to remove them effectively. The proscriptive landmine norm was influenced by 
the UNGA in several phases of the norm life cycle as described by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). The 
General Assembly played a significant role as an organizational foothold for the norm, picking up the 
cause of its entrepreneurs and helping to give the problem an international forum. The UNGA also played 
roles in the cascade portion of the life cycle by passing resolutions and keeping the issue at the forefront. 
It is not surprising that the General Assembly did not play a role in the entrepreneur stage since that is 
usually the role of more narrowly focused groups or people. The UNGA has played a role in the final 
phase with yearly resolutions which indicate a desire to increase norm internalization. In this case non-
great states are the primary beneficiaries of the norm and both state types and NGOs participated before 
the tipping point.  
     For this norm great powers are markedly uninvolved and the norm clearly benefits less developed 
states which suffer from land mine casualties far more often than great powers. This norm is defined as a 
weapons issue by this thesis and the lack of involvement of great powers is interesting for this reason and 
will be investigated further in the analysis of the cases. Overall the propositions seem to fit well with this 




     The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is another example of a proscriptive norm encapsulated 
within a treaty. The Chemical Weapons Convention promotes the more general norm of disarmament and 
recalls the General Assembly’s commitment to severely judging actions divergent from those of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol, which is specifically directed at prohibiting the use of gases and biological warfare 
which may asphyxiate or poison the target of the weapon (CWC Treaty Text 1993). Parties to the CWC 
are required not to have any chemical weapons in their possession or plan to acquire such weapons, not to 
use chemical weapons or prepare for their use, and to not help any other entity to acquire, use, or prepare 
to acquire or use chemical weapons (Text of the Chemical Weapons Convention 1993, Inventory of 
International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes 2011). The treaty does not ban targeted 
chemicals altogether but focuses on use; toxic chemicals may still be used for purposes not connected to 
chemical weapons use (CWC Treaty Text 1993).  
     Although several studies have been conducted on the non-use of chemical weapons, none of the major 
ones has discounted the strength of the prohibitionary norm and its relevance in preventing the use of 
chemical weapons. I argue that there is a prohibitionary norm in play and that a normative stigma against 
chemical weapons played a role in the choice of states not to use them, as it raised the difficulty in 
providing justification for their use and essentially limited the circumstances of use to desperation (Price 
1995). The norm against chemical weapons cannot be explained by it being militarily ineffective or 
because of its unique characteristics according to Price (1995) which invites investigation into the 
normative reasons for the nonuse of chemical weapons. The CWC text states that the purpose of the treaty 
is to benefit mankind, as well as to promote free trade and cooperation at the international level for the 
scientific community, and to promote the use of science for good and not harm. Furthermore, the CWC 
strives not to hinder states’ development technologically or economically in the implementation of the 
treaty (CWC Treaty Text 1993).  
     Chemical weapons have many sources of stigma. Chemical weapons are feared because they cause 
unnecessary suffering, are indiscriminate, and often cannot be seen before effects are felt; humans have 
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intrinsic fears of suffocating or choking which chemical weapons prey upon. However, less condemned 
weapons share many similar characteristics so these alone are not enough to determine why chemical 
weapons are so highly stigmatized. Chemical weapons are part of the poisonous weapons stigma, 
documented as early as 1589 when their prohibition was promoted by Alberico Gentili; this effectively 
marks the emergence of a non-poisoning norm. The spuriousness of poison has become normative for 
most people, partly because of the inability to protect oneself against its use. Part of this deligtimation 
process was that the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907 began to take up the issue of banning 
chemical weapons which were seen as a threat to civilian populations and were not seen as militarily 
important since the device had not yet come into being (Price 1995, Szinicz 2005). These conferences 
mark the true emergence of a norm against chemical weapons use, the beginning of the norm life cycle.   
     A push for the chemical weapons norm was the assertion of the Hague Conference that defines gas 
shells as a separate category of weapon, making it easy to denounce chemical weapons without tarnishing 
the names of other weapons, even those with similar features and consequences. A breach of a norm 
important enough to predate the weapon associated with it would surely impact the status of a state 
willing to violate it. This did not stop some states from using chemical weapons during the First World 
War (Szinicz 2005); instead of weakening the norm it strengthened it since use of chemical weapons 
allowed other states to strongly object and truly showed the horrors of chemical weapons use. This is 
partly what successfully led to the 1925 Geneva Convention which used the proscriptive chemical 
weapons norm as its base and acted as an organizational foothold (Price 1995, Szinicz 2005).  
     The limited use of chemical weapons during the Second World War is a good place to continue 
looking for norm development, because non-use is somewhat surprising during this conflict, and can be 
explained with three elements; both sides had warned the other against chemical weapons use; 
governments and public opinion showed a strong repugnance toward the use of chemical and biological 
weapons, and neither side was militarily prepared to use such weapons (they lacked sufficient numbers, a 
plan for use, or appropriate delivery systems). The British considered the using the weapons if German 
invasion became a reality but decided against it since the use was not consistent with British moralities 
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(Price 1995). This may show that the British, at least, had internalized the proscriptive chemical weapons 
norm as early as the Second World War. Deterrence cannot act as the sole explanation of this instance of 
non-use, especially because there were often times when chemical weapons offered a significant military 
advantage and little or no threat of retaliation (Price 1995, Szinicz 2005). This indicates that the norm 
started early and has lasted throughout major conflicts, demonstrating stability.  
     There are several other agreements and organizations in place which relate to the CWC. For example 
the Australia Group (est. 1985), provides coordination for chemical weapons export controls among 
thirty- two member countries and takes its job so seriously that the group has been accused of trade 
restrictions in non-weapon commodities.  The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 
formed in 1997, has the charge of implementing the CWC and can recommend penalties if 
noncompliance is found and in particularly serious cases can bring the issue before the UN Security 
Council or the UNGA (Arms Control Association 2012). Also, the Proliferation Security Initiative, which 
was launched in 2003, works to stop the transfer of all weapons capable of mass destruction, including 
chemical weapons. The UN Security Council produced Resolution 1540 in April of 2004, requiring 
member states to take all possible actions to prevent proliferation of these weapons, (Inventory of 
International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes 2011).  
     In this case two superpowers effectively acted as entrepreneurs for the proscriptive norm on chemical 
weapons by reintroducing it. The norm had long been left by the side without a binding instrument to 
support it. As early as 1962, while still in the thick of the Cold War, the United States and Russia were 
making steps toward general disarmament, including specific measures targeted at chemical and 
biological weapons. By 1968 chemical weapons were placed on the agenda of the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament (CCD), giving the norm a strong and persistent organizational foothold 
(Sikkink 1996), and by 1974 the US and the Soviet Union agreed to discuss the chemical weapons issue 
in an effort to create a joint proposal for submission to the CCD (CWC Chronology 2012) as well as 
signing the Threshold Test Ban Treaty limiting yields to one hundred fifty kilotons (Comprehensive Test 
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Ban Treaty Organization 2012, CWC Chronology 2012). Work toward a chemical weapons ban 
continued throughout the Cold War.  
      In 1980 an ad-hoc working group on chemical weapons was established in the Committee on 
Disarmament (CD), the successor to the CCD, and began working toward a chemical weapons solution in 
the form of a treaty. Following this significant step, in 1983 Vice President Bush announced the US 
conditions for creating an acceptable (to the United States) prohibition on chemical weapons. Later that 
year the US held a workshop on the topic in Utah, an invitation to which was not accepted by The Soviet 
Union or those participating in the Warsaw Pact, with the exception of Romania. However, the Utah 
workshop did garner the participation of thirty countries who were members of the CD; this participation 
may be seen as the tipping point for this norm. The following year, 1984, the United States presented a 
draft treaty which was quickly dismissed by the Soviet Union but was strong enough to become the center 
point of reference for the Ad Hoc Working Group of the CD. After that no significant progress was made 
until August of 1987 when the Soviet Union moved the process forward by accepting the standard of 
mandatory on-site inspections without the right to refuse, and invited delegates to inspect a Soviet 
selected military facility. This signifies another tipping point since the participation of the Soviet Union 
was essential for the progression of the norm. Further progress was made in the areas of disclosure and 
inspection, with the United States and the Soviet Union leading the charge into the next decade (FAS 
CWC Chronology 2012). The accumulated progress between 1984 and 1989 mark the tipping point in the 
norm life cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) with the most important point being the acceptance of the 
draft treaty by the Soviet Union. 
     The 1990s was a decade of much progress toward a chemical weapons treaty. In early 1990 the US and 
the Soviet Union settled on a framework for a Chemical Weapons Convention. In mid-1990 significant 
steps were taken when Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev signed an agreement on the 
Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons which called for the cessation of chemical 
weapons production, mandatory onsite inspections, and environmentally safe destruction methods. In 
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1991 President Bush declared that the United States would take steps to bring a swift and effective 
conclusion to the Chemical Weapons Convention.  
     In March of 1992, Australia presented a draft treaty offering compromises on some of the more 
contentious issues; the US praised the effort, committed to working toward solutions, and reaffirmed their 
desire to successfully conclude the CWC in 1992. Later that year the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee 
on Chemical Weapons at the CD released a “final text” draft which contained compromises; the United 
States accepted the draft proposal which was then revised, and was shortly thereafter supported again by 
the US. The United States also stated its desire to be one of the original members of the treaty and made 
an impassioned call for other states to follow suit. On January twelfth, 1993 one hundred thirty countries 
signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, marking the end of the cascade point of the norm life cycle 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The US signed the next day and the treaty was presented to the US 
Congress for ratification later that year. On April twenty-fifth 1997 the United States ratified the treaty 
and on April 29
th
 of the same year the treaty successfully accumulated the 65 required state ratifications 
and entered into force (FAS CWC Chronology 2012). Internalization was largely already achieved at the 
signing, as it had been spreading since restraint of chemical weapons use during the Second World War. 
By August of 2010 one hundred eighty-eight countries were parties to the treaty. Two other states had 
signed but not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and five had not signed; those five included 
Angola, North Korea, Egypt, Somalia and Syria (United Nations Treaty Collection 2012) this indicates a 
successful norm with a strong international presence, however; the news is not all good.  
     As late as July 2011, there were still concerns about the proliferation and presence of chemical 
weapons. The destruction schedule for the CWC is percentage based; states are required to destroy one 
percent in the first three years (by 2000), twenty percent after five years (2002), forty- five percent after 
seven years (2004), and one hundred percent after ten years (April, 29, 2007) (Arms Control Association 
2012). States are struggling to complete dismantlement of their chemical weapons stockpiles on time, the 
US and Russia will likely both fail to meet their extended deadlines and few states are meeting their 
original deadlines. These countries were the center of concern due mainly to their large chemical weapons 
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stockpiles and their role as international leaders, especially during the process leading to the CWC. Some 
estimates of the final United States dismantlement date stretch into 2021, fourteen years past the original 
goal date, and more than twice as long as called for by the treaty (Inventory of International 
Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes 2011).  
     The Chemical Weapons Convention encapsulates a norm which proscribes the use of chemical 
weapons in any circumstance. This norm was one of the original cases selected for this thesis since the 
issue type so clearly fits the weapons/security category and its success over time proves interesting. Great 
powers seem to be the beneficiaries of this norm when the life cycle began since they were more likely to 
use or be the target of these weapons at that time. Great states were also the entrepreneurs of this norm, 
primarily the United States and Russia who were interested in this issue for disarmament reasons. 
Australia and Germany also played significant roles in the norm life cycle before the tipping point. The 
UNGA played a moderate role the norm life cycle for the chemical weapons norm but of the weapons 
cases studied here the General Assembly was least involved in terms of the life cycle phases. The General 
Assembly acted as an organizational foothold, taking up the issue of chemical weapons and pushing for a 
solution, however this role as an organizational foothold occurred later in that phase. The UNGA also 
played a role in the internalization phase of norm life cycle for the chemical weapons norm, by 
admonishing states who violated the norm and encouraging participation.  
     My propositions seem to fit well with this case since the norm affected and was promoted by great 
states and the role of the UNGA was later and less than in the land mines case above. Furthermore, the 
involvement of great powers fits my expectations since this is clearly a weapons/ security issue. This 
norm also has an impact on non-greats and the non-conformity of some states such as North Korea and 
Egypt shows that the power of these weapons is alluring despite the presence of the proscriptive norm.  
Nuclear Test-Ban 
 
     The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty contains the final norm to be investigated in my 
weapons case studies. The treaty strives to create a regime based around the proscriptive norm against 
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nuclear weapon usage and desires to strengthen that norm to the point that no testing of nuclear weapons 
is acceptable. These desires are encapsulated within the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. This 
treaty is part of a greater effort to remove the threat of nuclear weapons and to eliminate or destroy them 
as part of general disarmament and obligates participants to not carry out any type of nuclear explosions, 
and to forbid nuclear explosions from occurring in any area they control. Furthermore, the treaty bans any 
encouragement of, participation in, or the causing of any type of nuclear explosion, including test 
explosions (Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Text 1996). The Test-Ban Treaty incorporates 
several norms besides the one of nuclear non-use; it is also sensitive to norms related to matters of 
developed versus undeveloped concerns, being careful to split both responsibilities and control, as well as 
stating the desire to not harm economic or technological development of the countries involved 
(Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Text 1996).  
     The text of the treaty recognizes previous efforts and measures; including disarmament talks, reduction 
in nuclear arsenals, and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. The text also recognizes the ban 
on tests as an effective way to slow, and hopefully stop, advancements in nuclear weapons and stopping 
the development of novel weapons. The treaty further recognizes the importance of the 1963 Treaty 
Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water; which seeks to 
stop nuclear test explosions.  It is noted that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty further serves to 
protect the environment from the consequences of such explosions, as well as promoting peace and 
security in the international sphere (Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Text 1996). The treaty also 
provides an organizational link; cooperating with the IAEA links the norm to a stable and important 
organization (Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Text 1996) as well as granting it a double 
“organizational foothold” (Sikkink 1996), one with the IAEA and one with the United Nations; in fact, 
the United Nations, and the General Assembly specifically, acted as primary or early organizational 
footholds (Sikkink 1996). The General Assembly is specifically included in the treaty text, which grants 
the UNGA the authority to allow the International Court of Justice to offer advice on any legal questions 
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relating to the treaty, an uncommon, but not unheard of, practice in international law (Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Text 1996). 
     The non-testing norm can be traced back to the 1950s with the test of a hydrogen bomb conducted by 
the United States. In early 1954 the United States inadvertently took the first steps toward a nuclear non-
testing norm when a bomb tested on the Bikini Atoll had yield far beyond expectations and exposed over 
two hundred fifty people to fallout (Bunn 1999, Pant, 2002, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 
2012). Twenty-three Japanese fishermen suffered from radiation sickness as a result and one fatality 
occurred, prompting India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to ask for a ban on such testing as the 
United Nations worked toward a more general and comprehensive disarmament agreement (Bunn 1999, 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 2012). Nehru acted as the entrepreneur for this norm 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) and called for total cessation of nuclear testing, repeating this desire at the 
General Assembly in December of 1954 (Pant, 2002, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 
2012). In 1955 President Eisenhower stated that participation in a test ban treaty would not benefit the 
United States’ national security; in 1958 he concluded that nuclear tests could be conducted underground 
and thus kept secret from other states, therefore making verification impossible. Progress was made in 
1959 with US propositions of test bans in the atmosphere, space, and underwater followed by the 
Antarctic Treaty in 1961, but onsite inspections remained a problem.  
     The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis raised concerns about nuclear proliferation globally, bringing nuclear 
issues back to the forefront; the General Assembly called for support and ongoing negotiations working 
toward a test ban treaty, acting as an organizational foothold. Onsite inspections continued to pose a 
problem in completing a treaty, but the Swedes offered several solutions with some success 
(Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 2012).  In 1962, with the encouragement of India, the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning nuclear tests by all states and for any 
reason. This resolution was supported by a large majority of member states, representing the tipping point 
of the norm life cycle (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), however; the US, the USSR, and some others 
abstained. Although these great states abstained from voting, the presence of a norm can still be seen, 
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although it was not yet very politically binding and certainly not considered legally binding (Bunn 1999, 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 2012). Further progress was made in 1963 with the signing 
of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) by all three of the nuclear powers at the time (the US, UK, and 
Soviet Union); the treaty stated that nuclear arms would only be maintained for deterrence practices but 
conceded that periodic testing was necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the arsenals. However, China 
became the fifth state to test a nuclear weapon in 1964 representing a setback (Pant, 2002, Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty Organization 2012). Still, the norm grew in strength and acceptance as many non-nuclear 
powers joined the crusade representing the cascade phase, and signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 
1968 (Bunn 1999, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 2012); coincidently the five named 
nuclear weapons states signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.  
     Two further treaties were signed in the 1970s; the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which limited nuclear 
yield of underground tests, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty, which limited the total yield of all 
nuclear explosions (Pant 2002). When India conducted its own nuclear test in 1974 many thought that the 
non-testing norm would be threatened. This was not the case, however, because India’s justification 
acknowledged the norm and the UNGA resolution, indicating that the norm was becoming internalized. 
Also, the indignation of other nations ran high, partly because India had supported non-testing in the past. 
Later that year both India and Pakistan affirmed their commitment to the non-testing ban and, after the 
French and Chinese tests, supported another General Assembly resolution “strongly deploring” the act of 
nuclear testing by those, and any other, states (Bunn 1999, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 
2012). In 1976 the CCD convened an Ad-Hoc Group of Scientific Experts which determined that 
determining when seismic events, indicating the conducting of underground tests, occurred was possible, 
opening the path to a verifiable test ban treaty. The Disarmament Convention, the CD, and the UNGA all 
began to bring this issue into the spotlight and the UNGA passed a series of related resolutions. However, 
the escalation of the Cold War prevented further progress on the norm until the 1990s (Pant 2002, 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 2012). 
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     In 1993, at the six hundred fifty-ninth plenary meeting of the CD, member states agreed to start 
negotiations for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, to be conducted by the Ad Hoc Committee 
on a Nuclear Test Ban. Also in 1993, the United States, along with India and several others, called for a 
resolution in the General Assembly supporting the multilateral negotiation of a Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test-Ban Treaty, which was endorsed unanimously and led to the beginning of negotiations on the treaty 
in January of 1994, this further cemented the internalization of the norm. Consultations on the structure of 
said negotiations were to be held between September of that year and January of 1994. Actual 
negotiations began in early February, 1994 (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 2012). In 1994 
the UNGA passed another resolution confirming its support for multilateral negotiations working toward 
a comprehensive treaty (FAS Nuclear Chronology 2012). The negotiations were quite protracted and 
concluded with the adoption of the treaty on September 10, 1996 by the UNGA, most states signed the 
treaty although India rejected it forthright (Pant 2002, FAS Nuclear Chronology 2012). One probable 
reason for India’s rejection of the treaty is that during the Test-Ban Treaty negotiations India was 
especially persistent that the treaty be anchored in the more general disarmament regime to improve its 
effectiveness (Pant 2002) and this was not achieved to the level desired.  
     Although the US had not, and still has not, ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
President Bill Clinton supported a ban on US nuclear tests after 1996, as long as other states did not test. 
The tests of India and Pakistan in 1998 essentially lifted this ban but the international norm on nuclear 
testing has proved strong enough to prevent further tests by the US. This norm was shown to be 
internalized due to the lack of testing, the justifications given when states did break or test the norm, and 
the decisions made by states in joining both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Test-Ban Treaty, 
confirming their belief in the non-testing norm. The existence of the norm is also supported because of its 
recognition by international lawyers (Bunn 1999) showing that internalization is substantial.  
     To enter into force the treaty requires ratification by 44 specifically named states. So far, most of the 
named states have signed and ratified the treaty but there are several notable exceptions which prevent the 
treaty from entering into force. India, Pakistan, and North Korea have yet to sign the Test-Ban Treaty and 
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China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States have signed but failed to ratify the treaty, although the 
Obama Administration has indicated that ratification may be pursued (The Acronym Institute 2009). 
Although some states have “cheated” such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea the norm of non-testing is still 
relatively strong, this is proven by the failure of rogue states to have much success at building or testing 
nuclear weapons as well as the number of states who have started but choosen not to pursue nuclear 
weapons programs (Hafemeister 2008). The UNGA continued to push the nuclear test-ban norm by 
passing a resolution calling for the CD to act expediently in order for the treaty to be ready to be put to 
vote at the fifty-first session of the UNGA. In September of 1996 the General Assembly voted one 
hundred fifty-eight to three with five abstentions to adopt the treaty and open it for signature (FAS 
Nuclear Chronology 2012). The General Assembly has been very supportive of the non-testing norm, 
producing four resolutions encouraging states to continue the moratorium on testing, to sign the treaty, 
and to ratify the treaty with expediency, each of these had overwhelming affirmative votes and showing 
the UNGAs involvement in the internalization phase (Hafemeister 2008).  
     Four decades of norm building and negotiations led to the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty and its subsequent adoption by the United Nations General Assembly through an 
overwhelmingly supporting vote on September 10, 1996. The reason the Test-Ban Treaty has not entered 
into force is due to the lack of required ratifications including those by the United States, China, and 
others which appear or claim to be waiting for US and/ or Chinese ratification before committing; (Bunn 
1999). Proscriptive norms indicate that there would be widespread denunciation and moderate to severe 
consequences if nuclear testing were to be pursued by any state, including great states, since all states 
seem to be bound by at least some type of anti-testing norm. For example, India and Pakistan are bound 
more by the potential political consequences of conducting nuclear tests, while Israel, the United States, 
Russia, and China are more legally bound to the norm due to participation in other measures, specifically 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Bunn 1999).  
     The final weapons/security norm that I covered was that of nuclear testing. The Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty encapsulates the norm proscribing the testing of nuclear weapons. This treaty is 
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one of the premiere pieces of global legislation in the twentieth century; it effectively bans testing by any 
state for any reason, making steps toward increased global safety. India, classified in this thesis as a non-
great state was the entrepreneur of this norm. This is the weapons case in which the General Assembly 
had a hand in the most phases of the life cycle. In the entrepreneurship stage the General Assembly was 
used as a platform only and did not take action itself.  This involvement naturally led to the UNGA being 
the primary organizational foothold for this norm. This participation led to contributions toward the 
tipping point, including the production of several resolutions. Also, the UNGA is involved in the 
internalization of this norm through its continued resolutions and support of the norm.  
     This is clearly a case dealing with weapons use, however; the regionally great state of India promoted 
the norm with little to no participation from other important players such as the United States, China, 
Iran, etc. This thesis only makes a distinction between great and non-great making the identification of 
India difficult. India’s ranking as a great state at this time is questionable and terming it a regional great 
state is a better assessment of India’s actual power, not able to dominate world politics but still having 
influence over them. This has especially been true due to the support of India in this position of power by 
the United States (Nayar and Paul 2003, Wholforth 2009). The propositions in this thesis do not account 
for the importance of regional greats such as India in connection with the involvement of the UNGA; it is 
clear that in this case UNGA involvement was relatively high and strong. Furthermore the norm here 
benefits both state type since the use of nuclear weapons would affect everyone although great states are 
the primary owners of nuclear weapons. This case is also interesting because the norm itself, while 
suffering several blows over the years such as the tests conducted by India, Pakistan, and France, and 
without the participation of important states, has remained intact and those who have violated the norm 
have been on the receiving end of admonishments and sanctions from the UNGA, the general public and 
other states. Showing high internalization and the impact that NGOs and the UNGA can have even when 





Conclusions on Weapons Norms: 
     Richard Price (1995) argues that chemical weapons are one of the few weapons whose use is actually 
perceived as morally illegitimate; while that may be true to a degree, the other two cases used in this 
section: nuclear weapons and anti-personnel landmines norms, also reflect moral disapprobation toward 
them. This seems to indicate an overall trend toward the success of disarmament norms and anti-weapons 
norms. The UNGA seems to play a role in the success of these norms and is generally involved in several 
stages of the norm life cycle when it comes to these types of norms; depicted in Table 2 below:  









No Yes No No Weakly 
Nuclear Test- 
Ban  
As a platform but 
not an instigator 
Yes Some Yes Yes 
Land Mines No Yes, Later No Yes Yes 
       
     In the entrepreneurship stage the General Assembly’s role appears to be limited to rarely serving as a 
platform for the introduction of new norms. This is unsurprising due to the very nature of norm 
entrepreneurship as understood by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) who indicate that this stage is often a 
grassroots type of effort limited to individuals or groups who face a problem directly. The UNGA plays a 
more active role in the other stages of the life cycle beginning with acting as an organizational foothold. 
This may be one of the most important roles the General Assembly plays since it is able to promote its 
agenda on a global scale, helping to move the norm forward. The UNGA plays a minor role in the tipping 
point stage. However, the General Assembly has an increasing role during the cascade stage in the nuclear 
test-ban and land mine norms by pressuring non-participating countries. However, it is often the case that 
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participating countries also take up a large role during the cascade stage and the importance of the 
General Assembly’s involvement begins to wane. The UNGA tries to participate in the final stage of the 
norm life cycle, the internalization stage in all three norms, passing resolutions and encouraging 
participation. 
     The role of state types in these cases is also interesting. In each case the type of positively affected 
state differs; in the landmine case it is non-greats, in the chemical weapons case it is great states, and in 
the nuclear test ban case it is both state types. Overall state participation is stronger than that with the 
environmental norms cases which follow, indicating that higher state participation may decrease UNGA 
participation. In the landmines case participation is mainly from non-greats, in the chemical weapons 
case, primarily greats, and in the nuclear test-ban case, the regionally great state of India plays a large 
role. As this thesis moves to look at the norm life cycle for environmental norms it is interesting to look 


























V. Process Tracing Environmental Norms 
 
     The norms which follow fall into the category of environmental protection. As with the weapons 
norms, these are proscriptive norms, banning certain actions. The process tracing of these norms closely 
follows the norm life cycle and the involvement of the United Nations General Assembly in that process. 
The norms I look at in this section are; the prohibition of transboundary waste transportation, preventing 
the use and production of persistent organic pollutants, and the proscription of dumping waste at sea, 
specifically oil. All of these norms fall into the larger environmental cluster focused on the protection of 
the environment and human health. The General Assembly is involved with all of these norms but only 
indirectly with the oil pollution norm. The General Assembly is also an important point of entry for G-77 
issues which often combine environmental and developmental issues (Kellow 2000). The developed- 
developing link is often clear in environmental norms and agreements; environmental norms and the 
treaties that encapsulate them often link the assistance offered by developed countries with the 
responsibilities and expectations for the work and responsibility expected from developing countries 
(Basel Convention 1989, Sands 1999, Stockholm Convention 2001). This is seen here in both the Basel 
and Stockholm Conventions and in a different way (through difficulty of implementation) in MARPOL.  
Transboundary Toxic Waste 
 
     The Basel Convention and eight related resolutions were adopted unanimously in 1989 by the 
Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on the Control of the Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes (Basel Convention 1989, Krueger 2002, Peiry 2010). The convention, 
formally known as The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal, is a treaty focused on the environmental protection norm specifically limiting 
the movements of hazardous wastes between states (radioactive substances were not covered in the Basel 
Convention). Going so far as to require that states take “all practicable steps” to dispose of wastes in such 
a matter that harm to humans and the environment is kept at a minimum, to reduce the amount of 
hazardous waste produced, and to have adequate disposal facilities and methods. Furthermore, if states do 
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plan to transport hazardous wastes between nations several strict guidelines must be met and specific 
protocols must be followed (Basel Convention 1989, Krueger 2002).  
     The Basel Convention is the only international instrument which regulates the transboundary 
movements of hazardous waste (Peiry 2010). Hazardous waste management has been on the international 
agenda since the early 1980s via its inclusion in UNEP’s Montevideo Programme on Environmental Law 
in 1981, which identified hazardous waste disposal as a problem that needed cooperation in international 
law to help solve and provided an organizational foothold for the norm (Peiry 2010, Basel Action 
Network 2012). The problems related to transport of hazardous goods, termed “toxic trade”, had gained 
the attention of governments, intergovernmental agencies, and ENGOs at the state and international level. 
The transboundary toxic waste norm came about due to public uproar because overseas hazardous waste 
deposits were found in African and other developing nations in the 1980s (Peiry 2010), marking the 
entrepreneurial stage of this norm life cycle. Hazardous wastes pose a problem for human health and the 
environment, especially when improperly stored or disposed of; waste can leak into groundwater, soil, 
and the atmosphere. (Krueger 2002, PEN Magazine 2010).  
     The text of the treaty cites both damage to environment and human health risks as causes to pursue this 
norm. The text also notes that transboundary shipments of these wastes have been on the rise and 
questions the morality of moving these wastes into developing countries which may struggle with the 
proper disposal of hazardous materials (General Assembly 42/183 1987, Basel Convention 1989, Krueger 
2002, Kellow 2000, Peiry 2010). The treaty text also states the hope that limiting transboundary 
movements of hazardous wastes will inspire states to decrease their use of products creating these wastes 
and improve the environmental friendliness of disposing of these wastes (Basel Convention 1989). Waste 
has a negative economic value which has pushed states to further reduce hazardous waste production to 
avoid negative economic impacts (Kellow 2000), compounded by  economic impacts of cleanup of 
hazardous wastes, this negative impact is heightened for poorer countries (Krueger 2002).  
     The Montevideo Program may have been the start of the road to the Basel Convention and can be said 
to represent an organizational foothold for the norm but the Khian Sea incident in 1986 brought to light 
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the true need for international legislation regulating the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, 
because of this impact I term it an entrepreneurial event, much like that which occurred with the Nuclear 
Test- Ban Treaty. The Khian Sea was a cargo vessel which left the port of Philadelphia in the United 
States loaded with a cargo of incinerator ash, with the target of disposing of the ash, a hazardous waste. 
The ship dumped some of its fourteen ton cargo on a Haitian beach and then attempted to offload more of 
its cargo on five different continents, being turned away each time due to the efforts of Greenpeace, 
another organizational foothold for this norm. The ship is suspected of dumping the rest of its cargo in the 
Indian Ocean. A further push for action came from an unlikely source, Swiss Chemical Companies, who 
truly acted as entrepreneurs and who pushed for a convention supporting the transboundary toxic waste 
norm as a public relations play after a chemical spill in Basel, Switzerland caused more than thirty tons of 
waste to enter the Rhine River and kill thousands of fish (O’Neill 2000, Basel Action Network 2012). The 
combination of these events proved both the need and the desire for action to be taken on the issue of 
hazardous wastes and their transport.  
     Some international and regional agreements pertaining to the transport of hazardous wastes existed 
before the Basel Convention, though none dealt with transboundary movement of those wastes. A few of 
these agreements are recognized by the treaty; including the Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, the Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the 
Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes adopted by UNEP in 1987 by decision 14/30 
represent the tipping point for toxic waste dumping issues, though not for transboundary movement. The 
Recommendations of the United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods 
which was formulated in 1957 and other declarations and regulations adopted and promoted by the United 
Nations are also recognized. All of these show that the UN and the General Assembly were strong 
organizational footholds for the norms encapsulated within the Basel Convention (Basel Convention 
1989, Basel Action Network 2012). The General Assembly also recognized the importance of the Cairo 
Guidelines as well as the London Guidelines as an important step in the process of managing hazardous 
waste transport (General Assembly 42/183 1987). 
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     The UNGA, in resolution 42/183 calls for the participation of all nations in the upcoming conference 
and convention and asks for the cooperation of all states in halting the transboundary movements of toxic 
waste (General Assembly 42/183 1987, Peiry 2010). This shows the General Assembly’s participation 
both as an organizational foothold promoting the norm and as a push toward the tipping point, using its 
influence to ask for broad state participation. It is clear that ENGO’s, specifically Greenpeace, worked 
within the structure or matrix of existing institutions, mostly the United Nations, with the considerable 
help and influence of the General Assembly since Greenpeace targeted the UN to act as the organization 
in the organizational foothold phase of the life cycle (Kellow 2000, Peiry 2010).  
     In 1987 UNEP mandated the creation of a working group focused on a global convention on hazardous 
wastes and the control of their transboundary movements (Peiry 2010), Greenpeace also launched a 
campaign against hazardous waste trade after their research revealed that waste traders had already sought 
to export over three hundred twenty-five million pounds of waste, mostly produced by actors Greenpeace 
saw as “irresponsible industry” (Basel Action Network 2012).   UNEP held a meeting in Budapest, during 
the World Conference on Hazardous Wastes, to promote the norm against transboundary movement of 
wastes. This meeting led to setting a conference in Switzerland, to adopt a global convention on this 
matter.  In December of 1987 the United Nations General Assembly took up the cause of traffic in 
hazardous wastes and products. The General Assembly recognized several decisions adopted by UNEP in 
1987. These decisions include; decision 14/19 on the International Register of Potentially Toxic 
Chemicals and decision 14/30 dealing with management techniques for hazardous wastes which are 
environmentally sound. The General Assembly also recognizes resolution 1987/54 by the Committee of 
Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods (General Assembly 42/183 1987, Peiry 2010, Basel Action 
Network 2012).  
     Negotiation for the treaty occurred between 1987 and 1989, making for a fast paced and extremely 
contentious negotiation, with one of the most contentious points being whether to implement a regulating 
system or an outright ban. The political tension was particularly high due to the diverse interests of 
negotiating parties and a fissure occurred between industrialized and developing countries which 
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continued throughout the negotiations process and was unrelenting, even after the signing of the 
convention (Krueger 2002, Peiry 2010). The Basel Convention makes the argument that some nations are 
unable to make the best decisions in terms of protection human health and the environment. Therefore, 
these nations need international policies implemented to protect human health and the environment. 
Originally, a weaker regime was implemented based on the principle of prior informed consent. However, 
Greenpeace successfully pushed for a full export ban on hazardous materials (Kellow 2000, Peiry 2010). 
By 1988 thirty-three countries had banned the importation of hazardous waste (Basel Action Network 
2012), representing the tipping point of the norm life cycle.  
     The treaty text encourages that further agreements (regional, bilateral, etc.) be made to increase the 
effectiveness and compliance with the convention as well as the “harmonization” of state policies (Basel 
Convention 1989, Peiry 2010). Regional regimes, treaties, and agreements saw a marked and significant 
increase after the signing of the convention. This is a clear representation of the beginning of the cascade 
phase of the norm life cycle. Two of agreements include the Bamako Convention (1991), prohibiting the 
entry of hazardous wastes into Africa and the Waigani Convention (1995), which prohibits waste imports 
into developing Pacific Island countries. International agreements also share links with the Basel 
Convention: the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (1998), and the 2001 Stockholm Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (Krueger 2002, Peiry 2010, Basel Action Network 2012).  
     The Basel Convention entered into force in 1992 in accordance with the treaty text which requires 
twenty ratifications or other forms of approval (Basel Convention 1989, Krueger 2002, Basel Action 
Network 2012). Also by 1992, eighty-eight states had passed laws banning the import of hazardous waste. 
Many regional agreements also came into existence in Africa, the Nordic countries, Central America, the 
European Union and others. By 1994 over one hundred countries had effectively banned the import of 
hazardous wastes (Basel Action Network 2012). These actions show a classic example of the cascade 
stage of the norm life cycle progressing as discussed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).  
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      From the time of signature many regional and other groups supported and pushed for a waste trade 
ban, which is considerably stricter than the informed consent regime put in place by the original 
convention. This is further supported by the fact that by 1995 over one hundred twenty countries had 
banned the import of hazardous wastes (Basel Action Network 2012). In September 1995 with Decision 
III/1 the parties chose to amend the convention to an outright ban. However, the ban has not reached the 
number of parties needed for ratification (Peiry 2010, Basel Action Network 2012). The ban had still not 
entered force as of 2010, with 69 countries that had ratified or joined in a consensus decision. As of the 
writing of this thesis 79 countries were participants in the ban amendment with the last addition in 
February of 2012, however, this is not enough because the convention stipulates that three fourths of the 
total number of signatories or two thirds of affected signatories must ratify amendments to pass them 
(Basel Action Network 2012, Basel Convention Webpage 2012). This lack of success may be traced back 
to the contention between a total ban and a regime of informed consent. The ban has received much 
support from various actors and although it has not received the required number of ratifications it is a 
strong enough norm to be followed by even non-signatories (Basel Action Network 2012).  
     For the first five years after the signing of the treaty the percentage of waste produced by OECD 
countries decreased in comparison to overall production and the percentage of waste sent to recycling or 
recovery increased, both significantly (Krueger 2002), showing a push toward compliance and 
internalization. However, the news isn’t all good; since the signing of the Basel Convention in 1989 
several participating countries have broken the norm. In 1998 high mercury content waste was sent from 
Taiwan to Cambodia, concealed as “cement cake”. In 2000 Japan shipped illegal hospital waste to the 
Philippines marked as “waste paper to be recycled”. Similar instances occurred in 2006 in Cote d’Ivore 
and continue to be problematic. These instances show that the norm is not fully internalized. However, 
the attempt made by the delinquent states to conceal the true contents of their shipments indicates that the 
norm is taken seriously and internalization is on the rise, with few overall violations (Krueger 2002, 
Widawsky 2006, Basel Action Network 2013).  
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     Flaws in the norm, such as varying definitions of what constitute hazardous wastes and inconsistent 
reporting systems exist, which make statistics unreliable. Therefore, compliance checks are nearly 
impossible and would be cost prohibitive. Although this seems disheartening, it is clear that the Basel 
Convention norm has managed to reduce the transport and production of wastes overall, and especially 
important; reduce the movement of some of the most harmful wastes from developed countries to 
developing countries. This reduction shows that the norm proscribing transboundary movement of 
hazardous wastes from richer to poorer countries has reached an international consensus, an important 
step toward internalization (Krueger 2002). By 2012 175 states had signed the treaty and only three of 
those have not ratified, most importantly the United States (Basel Secretariat 2012).  
     The Basel Convention encapsulates a norm which proscribes the transportation of hazardous waste 
materials between countries, and limits the methods by which they may be disposed of. The Basel 
Convention is one of the earlier pieces of global environmental legislation and offers an interesting case 
study for this reason. In this case, as with the Ottawa Treaty, NGOs played an important role in bringing 
the “toxic trade” issue to the forefront; Greenpeace is the most notable NGO involved. Swiss chemical 
companies, and the general public, played a role before the tipping point but states did not play a role 
until the tipping point. This norm benefits primarily non-greats since deposits of toxic waste were found 
primarily in developing countries with little ability to deal with them correctly.  
     As with the weapons norms I presented in the previous section the transboundary toxic waste norm 
does not reflect UNGA participation at the entrepreneurship stage of the norm life cycle. The UN and the 
General Assembly do act as strong organizational footholds for the norm but the influence of the UNGA 
begins to drop off after that. Although the UNGA does seem to have influence at the tipping point there is 
little to no influence in the cascade stage. Finally, UNGA is not found to be a part of the internalization 
stage for this norm. With this norm Greenpeace and Swiss chemical companies were the major actors 
prior to UNGA action; this is an interesting circumstance which does not seem to be accounted for in the 
propositions of this thesis since it was assumed that either states or the UNGA would be the primary 
promoters and NGOs were not taken into account. Due to neither type of state participating before the 
55 
 
tipping point this case is less than clear in terms of supporting or weakening the propositions. However, it 
is clear that this norm benefits less developed states more than great states since it is engineered to protect 
less developed states from exploitation. This is an environmental issue but it is unclear which type of 
power (great or non-great) participated first since Greenpeace and chemical companies were so 
instrumental in getting the issue put on the international agenda and the norm was promoted by NGOs 
and the UNGA.  
Persistent Organic Pollutants 
     The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants is an attempt to document the norm 
urging the discontinuation of the use and manufacture of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) which are 
known to be harmful to both human health and the environment. The Convention is a premier initiative in 
terms of protecting human health and the environment, a leading global concern on the environmental 
agenda (Lallas 2001). The treaty, which opened for signature in 2001 and became effective in 2004, 
points to the toxic properties of POPs and their protracted rate of degradation as well as potential harm to 
humans and the environment as reasons to implement the convention. As with the Basel Convention, 
which also deals with toxic goods, there is a clear developed-undeveloped dimension to the concerns of 
treaty participants (Stockholm Convention 2001). The specific norm here is the prohibition of POPs, the 
larger norms involved are protection of human health and the environment, and protection of developing 
countries; norms frequently seen in environmental agreements. There are several differences between the 
Basel and Stockholm norms, chiefly that the Basel norm restricts activity between nations (transporting 
toxic waste) while the Stockholm norm curtails activity within states’ borders (production of POPs). The 
norms are under slightly different umbrellas (more general norm groups) and are separated by more than a 
decade in terms of the original signing date.  
     POPs are invasive and harmful, making them a good target for global intervention. POPs are a 
problem in arctic climates just as much, if not more, than industrial areas due to cross boundary 
contamination/ pollution. The issues of long distance affects and persistence made the necessity of a 
global (rather than regional) instrument and approach clear (Karliganis et al 2001). The treaty text notes 
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that POPs tend toward bioaccumulation and, like toxic wastes, can be transported in both air and water, 
entering the food chain and harming many of its links along the way. These POPs are difficult to trace 
because they have the ability to cross boundaries and cause problems in countries not responsible for the 
origin of the pollutants (Stockholm Convention 2001, Lallas 2001, Rosencranz 2003, PEN Magazine 
2010), something that the Charter of the United Nations requires states to take responsibility for. Many of 
the chemical substances in question are linked with cancer, birth defects, immune system issues and other 
endocrine related illness (Lallas 2001, PEN Magazine 2010). This is especially a concern in developing 
countries in which exposure is less avoidable and can harm women and children but monetary resources 
are directed primarily toward social and economic development and eradication of poverty and little to no 
resources are left over for waste management. The text of the Stockholm Convention recommends the 
development of new processes and chemicals to make the use of persistent organic pollutants unnecessary 
and obsolete, as well perfecting environmentally sound disposal measures for those already produced or 
in use. These procedures, which should minimize human exposure and environmental harm, are an 
important concept in environmental regimes (Stockholm Convention 2001, Lallas 2001).  
     In the years prior to the Stockholm Convention states, both great and non-great, grew increasingly 
concerned about the negative effects of some chemicals and implemented a variety of national level 
measures to address these fears, making an entrepreneurial push toward dealing with them globally. This 
type of interest produced documents such as the Basel Convention. Due to the closely related nature of 
the Basel and Stockholm Conventions it may be possible to view the Basel Convention as part of the 
norm life cycle for the POPS norm; if viewed this way, Basel is an entrepreneurial through tipping point 
phase component of the life cycle. Global interest became clear in the 1990s with UNEP’s Chemicals 
Program, the Montevideo Programme, and others focused on environmental law, health, and 
environmental concerns (Lallas 2001), representing an organizational foothold for the Stockholm issues. 
Related decisions, declarations, provisions and etcetera preceded the Stockholm Convention. UNEP 
produced decision 19/13 C in 1997 which indicates a need to protect human health and the environment 
by reducing or eliminating POPs. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) and also 
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the Rotterdam (1998) and Basel (1989) Conventions deal with the trade of hazardous materials and lead 
logically to the management of hazardous substances such as POPs. The Rio Declaration as well as the 
Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States (1994) promotes 
the protection of developing countries as well as the norm of common but differentiated responsibility, 
also often included in environmental treaties (Stockholm Convention 2001, Lallas 2001, Rosencranz 
2003). The adoption of Chapter Nineteen of Agenda 21 at the Rio Conference in 1992, which calls for the 
“environmentally sound management of toxic chemicals” and focuses on the illegal transport of such 
chemicals, provided a push for increased dedication to the field of toxic chemicals and their transport 
(Lallas 2001). Before 1992 chemical waste issues were not at the top of the international agenda and 
efforts were focused on information exchange and assessment of risks involved with wastes. An 
important point for this issue was reached with the adoption of Agenda 21 by the UNCED; toxic 
chemicals became more important thanks to Chapter 19 (Karliganis et al 2001).  
     In 1994, to continue efforts toward limiting the negative effects of hazardous chemicals, the 
Intergovernmental Forum of Chemical Safety was established; this organization played a very important 
role in moving toward an agreement on POPs, acting as yet another organizational foothold (Lallas 2001). 
In March of 1995 the Governing Council of the UNEP invited several agencies to create an assessment 
process, to generate the initial list of twelve POPs, which was to include aspects of the chemistry, source, 
toxicity, environmental dispersion and socioeconomic impacts of the POPs in question. This led to the 
creation of an Ad Hoc Working Group on POPs which accomplished that task. In June of 1996 a meeting 
was held in Manila to consolidate and explore further information on POPs, the Ad Hoc Working Group 
decided that enough supporting information existed to proceed with plans for creating an international, 
binding instrument to decrease risks associated with POPs. They reported on a range of topics from the 
science behind POPs, economic and social impacts of POPs, alternative chemicals and other aspects 
(Karliganis et al 2001, Lallas 2001). In early 1997 the Governing Council called for a move toward treaty 
negotiations. In early 1997 this move was endorsed by the UNEP General Council when it adopted 
decision 19/13C and a convening of an international negotiating committee was called for, with hope for 
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completion of a legally binding document by the end of the year 2000 (Karliganis et al 2001). The treaty 
was to be focused solely on twelve substances identified as POPs, which helped to push the norm forward 
because the treaty was to be limited to twelve specific chemicals with a strict set of criteria to be met to 
add other substances and also has a list of viable uses for some POPs. This was a common ground for 
those who wanted to ban several more substances outright and those who were against an outright ban of 
any chemicals (Lallas 2001). The substances included in the original “dirty dozen” POPs were a 
collection of pesticides, industrial chemicals, and by-products (Karliganis et al 2001).The toxic twelve 
chemicals were already strongly regulated in many countries, making those chemicals less desirable, also; 
research had already begun to find viable alternatives. Furthermore, country specific exemptions 
reinforced the north-south division of common but differentiated responsibility even though broad 
differentiation was avoided. For example, DDT was one of the chemicals of primary concern but received 
some exemptions due to the need for malaria control in some countries (Lallas 2001). 
     The first session of the International Negotiating Committee (INC) was held in late June and Early 
July of 1998 in Montreal. Much was accomplished, including the establishment of the Criteria Expert 
Group (CEG) charged with the task of identifying POPS for future incorporation based on scientific 
criteria such as bioaccumulation, toxicity, persistence, and regional and global issues (Karliganis et al 
2001). As negotiations continued the involvement of developing (non-great) countries increased, 
especially for countries in which POPs posed significant health problems, leading to the tipping point of 
this norm (Lallas 2001).The second meeting of the INC focused on: decreasing releases of POPs into the 
environment, NIPs, information exchange, and monitoring. The third meeting of the INC took place in 
September of 1999 in Geneva where substantial progress was made although the text remained heavily 
bracketed. INC4 met in March of 2000 and successfully drafted several important articles while making 
progress on many others (Karliganis et al 2001). This quickly conducted negotiation process reflects a 
cascade of norm acceptance. As with the Basel Convention, the Stockholm Convention encourages 
further regional, bilateral, and multilateral agreements reflecting the purpose of the POPs norm and 
cooperation with organizations also involved in its promotion (Stockholm Convention 2001).  
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      As a result of the Stockholm Convention participating states are required to create and implement 
measures which attempt to reduce and mitigate risks associated with POPs, exporting equipment only in 
an effort for environmentally sound waste management, and to submit five year progress reports, among 
other things. Regional training workshops have been provided by the secretariat of the Stockholm 
Convention to educate parties on the safe disposal of POPs and their related machinery (PEN Magazine 
2010). The Stockholm Convention recognizes the necessity of time and financing because of the need to 
replace or refurbish equipment using POPs, thus a phasing out of POPs is expected by 2025, although 
production faced a more immediate ban and controlled waste disposal is expected by 2028. In an effort to 
increase the success of NIPs the convention has an independent financing mechanism. The Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) is the acting financial mechanism of the Stockholm Convention, has over 
one hundred eighty member countries and helps to support the Stockholm Convention by helping to fund 
many POP related projects in countries with developing and/or struggling economic conditions. The 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) is also an important mechanism 
supporting the Stockholm Convention by helping countries to meet their Stockholm Convention 
obligations. UNIDO focuses more on countries with struggling or in-transition economies, providing 
support, over fifty countries have asked for their assistance. UNIDO also provides continuing support and 
work toward green industrial practices as the Stockholm Convention expands its list of banned substances 
as well as pushing for technology transfer in clean technology (PEN Magazine 2010).  
     The eventual addition of new substances to the Stockholm Convention was a source of tension during 
the negotiations process because some states were reluctant to agree to something unknown; this issue 
was eventually resolved but the procedure is both long and complicated, leading to concerns about the 
feasibility of adding new POPs (Karliganis et al 2001) This process has not stopped new substances from 
being added. According to Karliganis (2001) financing and technical assistance issues also proved 
contentious. Another controversial issue was the effects that the Stockholm Convention would have on 
participating states’ economies, and the likely uneven nature of this impact, these concerns could not be 
shown to contradict WTO guidelines and fizzled out. The inclusion of precaution in the Stockholm 
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Convention was also a cause for some controversy since there was disagreement on the necessity of 
scientific data to prove absolutely the negative effects of POPs before their inclusion. This was resolved 
by a weak, reference to precaution in the preamble of the Stockholm Convention (Karliganis et al 2001).  
     The Convention was adopted on May twenty-second, 2001 and almost exactly three years passed 
before it entered into force. On May seventeenth, 2004 the Stockholm Convention entered into force, after 
the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification. At the time of the writing of this thesis one hundred 
fifty- two signatories and one hundred seventy-eight parties were a part of the Convention, showing a 
strong cascade and move into internalization (Stockholm Convention Status of Ratifications 2012). As of 
2010 twenty one POPs were covered under the Stockholm Convention (PEN Magazine 2010); this shows 
the Convention’s ability to add more substances and continued support and overall success for the norm it 
contains. The Secretariat posits that the success of the Stockholm Convention is not limited to the 
addition of chemicals to the list but also has been successful in four other areas; increasing scientific and 
political engagement, increases in awareness and behavioral changes, health benefits, and introducing 
alternatives (Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention 2012).  
     The Convention calls for best environmental practices and the use of best available techniques (PEN 
Magazine 2010); both of these may be a cause for lack of participation and/ or follow through from 
monetarily poorer countries. Although the United States did sign the treaty in 2001, no ratification 
instrument has been produced and none seems to be forthcoming. However, the Russian Federation and 
China have both ratified the Convention (Stockholm Convention Status of Ratifications 2012). Most 
parties have compiled lists of stockpiles; but different measurement techniques fail to give an accurate 
overall picture. By the end of 2008 eighty-eight countries had submitted National Implementation Plans. 
The implementation those plans will be especially difficult in less developed countries such as those in 
sub-Saharan Africa (PEN Magazine 2010) but their submission reflects a move to internalization.  
     Due to the similarity of the Stockholm and Basel Conventions the Conventions agree to cooperate on 
several specific points. Firstly, to determine maximum acceptable POP content in residues left behind 
after destruction. Secondly, agreement upon environmentally sound disposal methods is necessary. 
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Finally, the Conventions agree to determine the concentration of POPs in order to compare amounts to 
those remaining after destruction (PEN Magazine 2010). The instance of these Conventions working 
together strengthens them politically and allows for lower overall costs when implementing them, both of 
which may be a cause of higher state participation and internalization of the incorporated norms.  
     The second norm I investigated for the environmental group was the proscription of producing organic 
pollutants. This norm is encapsulated within the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. 
This norm benefits developing states for much the same reasons as the toxic waste norm; developing 
states do not have the structure or funds to deal with the consequences of these pollutants. The UNGA 
played roles in the POPs norm life cycle only so far as it was involved in the Basel Convention. This case 
is an interesting one due to its similarities to the transboundary toxic waste case, both deal with hazardous 
materials, and the juxtaposition of the two yielded some intriguing results. Both types of states played 
roles before the tipping point, and the norm benefits primarily citizens of non-great states. Also, the 
UNGA played a role only in the organizational foothold stage and only if the Basel Convention is 
accepted as part of the life cycle for the POPS norm. This is intriguing in terms of state participation and 
UNGA involvement especially because the UNGA cannot be shown to be a significant promoter of the 
norm since UNEP and NGOs played that role. This is an environmental and human health issue, in which 
I expected the UNGA to have a higher level of involvement.  
Oil Pollution 
     The final environmental norm included is encapsulated within MARPOL 73/78, and targets pollution 
caused by or released from ships. MARPOL began as the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships, 1973 but did not have much success. In 1978 the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973  was added and essentially 
absorbed  the original document; it garnered more attention and was more successful (MARPOL Treaty 
Text 1978, Griffin 1994, Becker 1998, IMO 2012). The 1973 convention aims to protect the human and 
marine environment. Oil being purposefully or accidentally released from ships was seen as a threat to the 
environment and the humans living in it due to the pollutive qualities of that oil (MARPOL Treaty Text 
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1978). There are between one and two hundred substances in every ten thousand pounds of oil known to 
cause cancer. These carcinogens’ impacts go beyond the deaths of marine animals such as birds, fish, and 
marine organisms caused by the initial spill; it disrupts the food chain by killing phytoplankton, which is 
a food source for commercial fish. If food source organisms do not die they absorb the hazardous material 
and pass it along in the food chain for consumption by other animals and, eventually, humans (Curtis 
1985, Griffin 1994). These spills also have a detrimental effect on the beauty of the natural environment 
and the ability to use it (for commercial or leisure purposes). The cost of dealing with the losses 
associated with oil spills and pollution is high, both socially and monetarily (Curtis 1985). MARPOL 
helped to level the playing field by making requirements the same for every state, avoiding a race to the 
bottom effect in order to drive down costs and increase profits (Curtis 1985).  
     The fact that some oil enters the ocean is not unexpected since millions of tons are shipped each year 
using sea going vessels as means of transport. These vessels are responsible for the release of over one 
million tons of oil every year. This oil release is due to many factors, including various aspects of ship 
operations as well as accidental spills. The cases of release caused by accidental spills are often widely 
publicized, such as the infamous Exxon Valdez spill, the biggest human caused disaster in United States 
history, which killed thousands of marine animals and cost Exxon over three billion dollars in damage 
control. Tanker spills are a big pull for media attention but don’t tell the whole story of oil release. Only 
about twenty five percent of oil release is due to accidental discharge while the remaining seventy- five 
percent is caused by operational discharge, making operational discharge responsible for three times the 
oil release than accidental releases (Griffin 1994, Mitchell 1994). In Curtis’ (1985) paper he estimates that 
operational discharge accounts for over eighty- five percent of ship discharges. 
     Two major ship operations cause most of the pollution targeted by the oil pollution norm, ballasting 
(purposefully taking on water to add to the vessel’s weight) and cargo tank washings. These activities 
result in oil release when ballast and water used for cargo tank washing is discharged back into the ocean 
instead of into appropriate shore facilities or after cleaning (Curtis 1985, Griffin 1994, Mitchell 1994). 
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For a 200,000 ton tanker ballast discharge can be up to eight hundred tons of oil, every single time it takes 
on and discharges ballast (Curtis 1985). 
      MARPOL 73/78 may be enforced in three ways; ship inspections, monitoring discharge compliance, 
and punishing violations. For the first type of enforcement flag states routinely inspect vessels for 
MARPOL compliance and port states may conduct an inspection if violations seem present. For the 
second type of enforcement monitoring may be conducted by any state but suspected violations must be 
forwarded to the respective flag state (Griffin 1994, Mitchell 1994, Becker 1998). Verification of all ships 
is nearly impossible since so many ships travel in international waters and are required to comply; the 
lack of reception facilities is also a problem, as well as the reliance upon flag states for legal action and 
punishment. Monitoring is difficult to carry out and it is infrequent that ships are successfully caught 
violating the oil pollution norm since there are millions of miles of ocean and it is difficult to link slicks 
with ships (less than 25% are connected). As for enforcement through punishment, flag states who 
confirm violations must impose penalties which match the severity of the violation(s) (Curtis 1985, 
Griffin 1994, Mitchell 1994, Becker 1998).  
     In 1924 the United States acted as an entrepreneur for a norm against oil pollution and took action 
against the marine pollution affecting it as a coastal state with the Oil Pollution Act of 1924. This was 
followed by the Preliminary Conference on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters, held in Washington in 
June of 1926, which aimed to limit oil discharge into the sea. Due to the lack of tangible pollution for 
many states receptivity was low but a ban on discharge within fifty miles of the coastlines was adopted. In 
1934 the United Kingdom asked the League of Nations to address the oil discharge problem but the threat 
of war made the world uninterested (Curtis 1985). The International Maritime Consultative Organization 
(IMCO), was created by the UN Maritime Conference in 1948 (Becker 1998) and acts as an 
organizational foothold for the OILPOL and MARPOL Conventions which followed. The further 
development of the IMCO in the 1950s was another step in the direction of shipping regulations. 
Although IMCO did not assert its presence immediately it was involved in forming maritime safety 
regulations (Curtis 1985).  
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     The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1954), known as 
OILPOL 54, is acknowledged as an important instrument in terms of protecting the marine environment 
(MARPOL Treaty Text 1978). This was the first time the international community came together to take 
action against marine pollution, thirty-two countries, representing ninety-five percent of the shipping 
tonnage of the world had representation at the conference (Curtis 1985, Griffin  1994, Mitchell 1994). 
However, the Convention only banned oil discharges within fifty miles of land while participants rejected 
other, more meaningful, measures, objecting to added financial burdens which would be imposed with 
stricter regulations. OILPOL 54 was important, however, because it set a precedent for international 
meetings and negotiations dealing with oil pollution issues (Curtis 1985, Mitchell 1994).  
     Eight years later in 1962 IMCO called a conference in which the 1954 Convention was amended to 
also apply to smaller tonnage ships as well as extend prohibited dumping zones. Still, the 1954 
Convention and the 1962 amendments only pushed pollution origins further away from coastal areas and 
did nothing about decreasing the total amount of pollution introduced into the oceans (Griffin 1994, 
Mitchell 1994). In 1969 OILPOL 54 was amended again, adopting the Load on Top (LOT) system which 
loads ballast water and then allows time for its separation from oily residues before discharging, in an 
effort to decrease oily discharge. However, LOT conflicts with the 1962 amendments prohibiting 
discharge from twenty thousand plus ton tankers as well as the parts per million limitations in the original 
1954 Convention. The 1969 amendments prohibited discharges from ships unless several qualifications 
were met but the new amendments had no requirements for reception facilities and did not enter force 
until 1978 (Curtis 1985, Mitchell 1994). MARPOL supersedes OILPOL 54 and its amendments upon its 
entry into force.  MARPOL is an extension of this treaty, designed to protect the marine environment 
from “harmful substances or effluents containing such substances” (MARPOL Treaty Text 1978, Curtis 
1985, Griffin 1994). In the decade before MARPOL 73 exports of crude oil were on the rise, more than 
tripling. This increase in exports led to an increase of transport by ocean going vessels and more 
operational pollution (Curtis 1985).  
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     The 1970s brought change to the problem of oil discharge, by then it was clear that the current system 
of load on top (LOT) wasn’t working due to difficulty of operation and ease for crews to ignore it. The 
United States, still unconvinced of the effectiveness of LOT and unable to confirm its use, threatened to 
require segregated ballast tanks (SBTs) in national waters and warned that it would act unilaterally in 
other ways to prevent oily discharge in its own and other waters. The threat was convincing enough to 
move forward with the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 
(MARPOL 73, Griffin 1994, Mitchell 1994). After the Torrey Canyon event and the formation of the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee in 1973 (showing a rise in environmentalism) environmental 
concerns began to match safety concerns (Curtis 1985, Mitchell 1994) this was the beginning of the 
tipping point stage for the proscriptive norm dealing with oil discharge into waters. MARPOL 73 was 
different from previous maritime pollution conventions because it required ships to have SBTs and oil 
separating equipment and applied to all ships with ocean operations. These structural and operational 
requirements are the crux of the convention and its amendments (Curtis 1985). The 1978 Tanker Safety 
and Pollution Prevention Conference and Protocol to MARPOL 1973 was pushed by the United States 
due to several oil tanker accidents between 1976 and 1977 which renewed interest in regulation. The 1978 
Protocol implemented several changes, requiring more strenuous ballast restrictions and attempting to 
eliminate the ineffective LOT system. 
     The initial 1973 convention opened for signature on January fifteenth 1974 and was open for accession 
after December thirty- first 1974. The 1978 Protocol opened for signature on June first 1978 and 
remained open until May thirty- first 1979 after which it remained open for accession (MARPOL Treaty 
Text 1978). The rules for entry into force for the initial convention are complex; the convention enters 
into force twelve months after fifteen states, representing fifty percent of the gross tonnage of the world’s 
merchant shipping, have become parties to the convention. The 1978 Protocol enters into force under the 
same conditions (MARPOL Treaty Text 1978). Ratification was a longer than anticipated process and 
MARPOL 73/78 did not enter into force until October of 1983 (Curtis 1985, Mitchell 1994, IMO 2012), 
representing the beginnings of internalization. This five year gap shows that the cascade phase was slow 
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or delayed for this convention but did occur. The treaty text indicates the belief that a universal document 
containing rules to prevent accidental and eliminate purposeful discharge of oil and its byproduct 
pollutants into waters unintended for that purpose was needed. (MARPOL Treaty Text 1978). 
     The Annexes for the Convention and its subsequent Protocol outline regulations for different 
pollutants, Annex I covers oil while annexes two through five address chemicals, tanks and containers, 
sewage, and garbage respectively (Curtis 1985, Griffin 1994, IMO 2012). The Convention also 
effectively creates a regime for the enforcement of the regulations in which flag states are responsible for 
enforcement. Annex I is the most ascendant annex for MARPOL; oil pollution was the main cause for the 
calling of the conference which led to the Convention (Griffin 1994, Becker 1998).  MARPOL looks to 
decrease vessel pollution in two ways; first by regulating the on board operations of oil transporting 
vessels, second by regulating the design of ships in ways intended to reduce opportunities for pollution to 
occur (Griffin 1994). Between October of 1983 and May of 1984 the US Coast Guard inspected over two 
thousand ships; over eighty- eight percent of them were compliant with certificate and oil record book 
requirements indicating progression of the internalization phase. Still, there are reports of tankers 
avoiding pollution control requirements whenever possible due to the cost and time required to comply 
(Curtis 1985). 
     In 1992 another important step was made when major amendments to MARPOL 73/78 were adopted. 
These new amendments came into force in 1993 and required novel design and construction standards on 
both new and existing tankers, such as double hulls which had been lobbied for by the United States. 
These amendments protect against accidental spillage by requiring the construction of a double hull or 
some similarly reliable substitute and were a foreseeable extension of the treaty (Griffin 1994). Also in 
1993 Princess Cruises found itself on the largest fine ever levied for ocean dumping, having to pay 
500,000 dollars after passengers provided video evidence of crew members dumping trash into the 
Atlantic Ocean. In 1996 Royal Caribbean Cruises was indicted for illegally dumping oily bilge water and 
then falsifying documents to cover it up (Becker 1998). These incidents show that while dumping does 
occur violators can be caught and prosecuted successfully. 
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     The Oil pollution norm encapsulated within MARPOL has had success in decreasing pollution, 
relating directly to the number of participating states. In 1994 over seventy countries, equaling ninety 
percent of the global tonnage had ratified the Convention showing significant progress in internalization 
and indicating the end of the cascade phase. During the decade after the 1978 Protocol was signed marine 
oil pollution decreased by about sixty percent. Between 1973 and 1990 operational pollution dropped by 
an astounding eighty- five percent, from 1.08 million tons to .16 million tons due to operational loss 
yearly. MARPOL 73/78 is seen as effective due to its physical requirements (such as double hulls and 
certain equipment) which have high rates of compliance, not because it regulates operational discharges, 
which suffer from lower rates of compliance due to lack of transparency (Griffin 1994, Mitchell 1994). 
     Often flags of convenience (FOC) are used by ships who wish to avoid strict regulation since most 
FOC states don’t have the political or economic incentive to strictly uphold MARPOL standards. This can 
lead to more accidents and violations. One way to solve this conundrum is to give more enforcement 
power to non-flag states, however, some states, such as the US, are concerned that non-flag states may 
abuse that power for political gain. Yet another issue is the variance in standards among states, where 
passing grades and sufficient evidence of illegal activities varies significantly. One reason for this is the 
difficulty that developing nations have with implementing so many requirements and standards because 
of cost and a lack of the appropriate technology and personnel, making it difficult for these states to fully 
internalize the norm (Griffin 1994, Becker 1998). The National Academy of Sciences conducted a study 
which estimated that 50 percent of tankers violated the discharge limit and a revision of the same study 
eight years later dropped that percentage to 15-20 but did not provide supporting evidence (Mitchell 
1994). Of the 1000 reported violations reported to the IMO through 1998 over fifty percent were not dealt 
with by the flag state. Only seventy-seven resulted in any type of repercussions (Becker 1998). One 
problem here may be that the norm could be supported by states but not by tanker operators. Still, the 
MARPOL norm has reduced oil pollution, accidents now account for only five percent of oil pollution in 
the oceans while operations account for seven percent, other shipping accounts for fourteen percent of 
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pollution and seventy four percent is industrial waste (Griffin 1994) this shows some internalization has 
occurred, it is clear however, that this final phase of the norm life cycle is not complete.  
     The final case for the environmental group was the oil pollution at sea norm which encapsulates the 
norm proscribing the practice of releasing oil into oceans or other international waters. MARPOL also 
limits other potentially harmful dumping practices/materials. I focus here on the oil dumping norm, the 
primary reason for MARPOL. This case proved interesting when put through process tracing. The US, a 
great state, was the entrepreneur and primary actor before the tipping point. The US acted unilaterally and 
other great states balked at the measures it attempted to put into place. This shows the power of one great 
state in agenda setting for normative issues.  
     The UNGA had very limited involvement in this case failing to act as an organizational foothold, a 
role it plays in all of the other norms. Furthermore, the influence the General Assembly had in the norm 
life cycle does not meet the thresholds for participation in any of the phases as described by Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998). It is interesting to note, however, that the United States played a strong 
entrepreneurial role through their use of domestic legislation, and continued to support oil discharge 
measures throughout the process.  The norm benefited the US, a great state but circumstances were 
unusual because the norm truly benefits coastal states rather than following the great/ non-great division. 
Also of interest is the lack of involvement from other states, although other states did eventually support 
the measure. Also important is the apparent benefit to both non-great and great states. The state typology 
seems to be flawed in this case since the division seems to actually be between coastal and non-coastal 
states not between great and non-great states. This seems to fit with the proposition that the UNGA plays 
less of a role when great states are more involved. However, this issue is an environmental one, where I 
do not expect as much participation from a great state although the lackluster participation from other 
states fits well.  
Conclusion: 
     Price’s (1995) argument that use of some types of weapons is illegitimate due to moral concerns seems 
to also hold true for many environmental issues, including the ones studied in this thesis as Nadelmann 
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predicted (Nadelmann 1990). This may be partially responsible for morally framed environmental issues 
such as those covered by the Basel and Stockholm Conventions as well as MARPOL. The UNGA seems 
to play a role in the success of these norms, most notably in the organizational foothold of the norm life 
cycle. In the organizational foothold stage we see UNGA activity in two of three norms, in the tipping 
point and cascade stages there is some UNGA participation in the transboundary toxic waste norm. There 
are negligible amounts of UN participation in the entrepreneurship and internalization stages of all three 
norms. This information is presented in Table 3 below: 








Toxic Waste  





Yes, if Basel 
Convention 
included in 
norm life cycle 
No No No 
Oil Pollution 
of the Sea 
No No No No No 
 
     The role of the UNGA as an organizational foothold seems to be extremely important since this occurs 
before the tipping point and gives norms a way to be included on the international agenda and moved 
forward. The MARPOL norm is a clear opposite in this stage and has little UNGA participation over all, 
an interesting characteristic which is analyzed and discussed more in the concluding section of this thesis. 
The UNGA begins to play a lesser role in the tipping point stage and the cascade phase, perhaps because 
its influence is less necessary. It is clear that there are many similarities and some differences in between 
the weapons and environmental norms. As I move into the concluding section of this thesis I lay out these 
comparisons and attempt to discover the usefulness of my propositions.  
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     The role of state types varies in these cases. While all three of these cases may be classified as 
environmental cases the United States, a great state, is the primary actor in the oil pollution norm, 
contrary to my propositions. It is possible that a division of great and non-great states is not appropriate 
for the oil pollution case and states would be better classified as coastal and non-coastal. Overall, states of 
both types have spotty participation in environmental norms. This is not unexpected since norms 
























    Weapons and environmental issues are different points on the spectrum of global issues warranting 
legislation. The cases studied here represent different types of environmental and weapons issues and 
hopefully are a relatively good representation of those issue types and the regimes related to them. My 
propositions look at three factors in relation to the role of the UNGA; the type of state(s) participating, the 
type of issue, and the benefiting state type. They are written as follows and are based on the idea that the 
UNGA participates in the norm life cycle in different ways and at different times depending on the area of 
interest covered by the norm and the states and entrepreneurs involved. 
          I propose that the role of the UNGA may be influenced by the participation of and type of state 
(great power or non-great) and the type of issue (i.e.; environmental or weapons) involved in the norm. 
The juxtaposition of these factors may help to tell a story of when and why the UNGA participates in the 
norm life cycle. I expect that the involvement of great powers, due to their desire and ability to act 
unilaterally and/or with forceful persuasion, would decrease the level of participation from the UNGA 
while norms that benefit non-greats/ developing countries would show increased participation since these 
states often rely on public international venues to promote their agendas. I also expect that weapons issues 
and environmental issues will show different levels of involvement, related to the type of state interested 
in each issue type. Therefore I would expect to see less UNGA participation in the life cycle of weapons 
norms, often promoted by great powers, and more UNGA participation in the life cycle of environmental 
norms which often benefit developing countries. These propositions were created in an attempt to learn 
more about certain processes in global governance and the role that the United Nations General Assembly 
plays in that governance. This information could benefit policy makers and help them to focus their 
resources on the causal paths that matter most for weapons and/ or environmental issues. Hopefully the 
conclusions reached here will help to reach that goal. 
     Six total norms were chosen for use in this thesis. The norms chosen for the weapons cases were the 
landmine norm encapsulated within the Ottawa Treaty, the chemical weapons norm encapsulated within 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the nuclear test-ban norm encapsulated within the 
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Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Each of these norms is proscriptive, disallowing the use of each 
of the weapons in question. The norms chosen for the environmental cases were the toxic waste transport 
norm, encapsulated within the Basel Convention, the persistent organic pollutants norm, encapsulated 
within the Stockholm Convention and the oil pollution at sea norm, encapsulated within MARPOL 73/78. 
Each of these norms is also proscriptive, disallowing the use or release of specific substances. 
Table 4 below shows the involvement of the UNGA in each case in relation to the issue type: 
Table 4:  
Norm Issue Type UNGA Participation 
Land Mines 





Chemical Weapons  Security/Weapons 
Organizational 
Foothold, Internalization 
 Nuclear Test-Ban  Security/Weapons 
Organizational 






Foothold, Tipping Point,  
POPs Environment 
Organizational Foothold 
if Basel Convention 
included in life cycle 
Oil Pollution Environment None 
 
     This table shows that UNGA participation in the organizational foothold of the norm life cycle is the 
most prevalent. The UNGA is involved in this stage in five of the six cases; this shows that the issue type 
does not affect this stage of the norm life cycle.  Internalization involvement of the UNGA is more 
prevalent in the weapons issues, as is overall involvement. The oil pollution treaty seems to be anomaly, 
with no UNGA participation at all. These findings are contrary to my original predictions, since I believed 
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that the UNGA would be more involved in environmental treaties. Perhaps environmental issues are 
supported more in other arenas such as the UNEP and are, therefore, not targeted as much in the UNGA.  
Table 5 below shows the involvement of the UNGA in each case in relation to state type(s) participating: 






No China, Russia or US 
participation, 
Participation of middle 
states and non-greats 
Organizational 
Foothold,  Cascade, 
Internalization 
Chemical Weapons  
Great: Russia and US - 
No participation from: 
Angola, North Korea, 
Egypt, Somalia and Syria  
Organizational 
Foothold, Internalization 
 Nuclear Test-Ban  
Non-Great: India - 
Trouble from India and 
Pakistan; little 
participation from US, 
China, Iran, etc. 
Organizational 






Foothold, Tipping Point,  
POPs Scattered 
Organizational Foothold 
if Basel Convention 
included in life cycle 
Oil Pollution 
Great: US/UK-- 
Participation from less 
developed spotty 
None 
      
     This table explores how the participation of states and the UNGA is related. There seems to be a 
positive correlation between scattered state participation and decreased levels of involvement for the 
UNGA. The most participation form the UNGA comes when participation of great states is lower, this fits 
well with my propositions. Interestingly the participation of the UNGA is higher when middle and non-
greats are participating in the norm, confirming the idea that these states may use the UNGA to push a 
norm forward in the crucial middle stages of the norm life cycle. Furthermore, the UNGA participates in 
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the tipping point stage in two cases where broad state participation is not high showing the ability of the 
UNGA to push a norm along when state participation is low. 
Table 6 below shows the involvement of the UNGA in each case in relation to type of state benefiting: 
Table 6:  
Norm Benefiting State Type UNGA Participation 




Chemical Weapons  Great 
Organizational 
Foothold, Internalization 
 Nuclear Test-Ban  Both 
Organizational 






Foothold, Tipping Point,  
POPs Non-Great 
Organizational Foothold 
if Basel Convention 
included in life cycle 
Oil Pollution Both/ possibly mistyped None 
 
     This factor of benefiting state type seems to have the least individual impact. Although the UNGA has 
the most participation in the life cycle of the nuclear test ban norm but there seems to be no real 
correlation between this factor and UNGA involvement. Individual stages of the norm life cycle also do 
not seem to be influenced by this individual factor. 







Table 7:  





Security/Weapons         
(Human rights?) 
No China, Russia or US 
participation, 
Participation of middle 
states and non-greats 
Organizational Foothold,  
Cascade, Internalization 
Chemical Weapons  Security/Weapons 
Great: Russia and US - 
No participation from: 
Angola, North Korea, 




 Nuclear Test-Ban  Security/Weapons 
Non-Great: India - 
Trouble from India and 
Pakistan little 
participation from US, 
China, Iran, etc. 
Organizational Foothold, 






Tipping Point,  
POPs Environment Scattered 
Organizational Foothold 
if Basel Convention 
included in life cycle 
Oil Pollution Environment 
Great: US/UK-- 




     This table combines two factors, issue type and the type of state(s) participating. The juxtaposition of 
these two aspects yields some interesting results. UNGA participation is highest in the two cases which 
combine a weapons issue with participation of moderate and non-great powers. The UNGA has middling 
amounts of participation in those cases which combine a weapons issue with great state involvement or an 
environmental issue with scattered state involvement. Finally, the UNGA is not active in the case which 
features an environmental issue championed almost unilaterally by a great state. This amalgamation of 
factors, while reflecting expectations of the individual elements seems to make an even more convincing 
case for the importance of both factors in conjunction with one another. Of course, more cases would be 
necessary for confirmation of these tentative results. 
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Table 8 below shows the involvement of the UNGA in each case in relation to issue type and state type 
benefiting from the norm: 
Table 8:  
Norm Issue Type Benefiting State Type UNGA Participation 
Land Mines 
Security/Weapons         
(Human rights?) 
Non-Great 
Organizational Foothold,  
Cascade, Internalization 
Chemical Weapons  Security/Weapons Great 
Organizational Foothold, 
Internalization 
 Nuclear Test-Ban  Security/Weapons Both 
Organizational Foothold, 






Tipping Point,  
POPs Environment Non-Great 
Organizational Foothold 
if Basel Convention 
included in life cycle 
Oil Pollution Environment Both/ possibly mistyped None 
      
     The table above (Table 8) shows the combination of issue type and the type of state benefiting from 
the norm. The UNGA had the most involvement with weapons issues benefiting both state types followed 
closely by weapons issues benefiting non-great states. The UNGA has less, but still pronounced, 
involvement in the cases which reflect weapons norms benefiting great powers and environmental norms 
benefiting non-great powers. The final case, reflecting an environmental norm benefiting both state types 
has the least UNGA participation. The combination of these two factors does not appear to be more than 
the sum of their parts as the combination of issue type and state participation was. In fact, it seems that 
issue type has a stronger influence than that of benefiting state type. Still, this analysis does fit with the 
idea that norms benefiting both types of states followed by those benefiting non-greats are prone to more 
UNGA participation. Clearly, however; the oil pollution norm does not fit in this box; perhaps this issue 
is mistyped and the differentiation should be between coastal and non-coastal states not greats and non-
great powers as the thesis defines it here.  
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Table 9 below shows the involvement of the UNGA in each case in relation to state type participating and 
state type benefiting from the norm: 




Benefiting State Type UNGA Participation 
Land Mines 
No China, Russia or US 
participation, 
Participation of middle 
states and non-greats 
Non-Great 
Organizational Foothold,  
Cascade, Internalization 
Chemical Weapons  
Great: Russia and US - 
No participation from: 
Angola, North Korea, 




 Nuclear Test-Ban  
Non-Great: India - 
Trouble from India and 
Pakistan little 
participation from US, 
China, Iran, etc. 
Both 
Organizational Foothold, 






Tipping Point,  
POPs Scattered Non-Great 
Organizational Foothold 
if Basel Convention 
included in life cycle 
Oil Pollution 
Great: US/UK-- 
Participation from less 
developed spotty 
Both/ possibly mistyped None 
 
     This table (9) shows the combination of the two factors dealing with state type; the type of state(s) 
benefiting and the type of state(s) participating. This combination is an attempt to look at the cases 
without considering issue type as a factor. Unfortunately this pairing seems to have no rhyme or reason in 
terms of UNGA participation. The UNGA plays the largest role when state participation is mostly from 
non-greats and benefiting both state types, followed by non-great/non-great, scattered participation 
benefiting non-greats, great participation benefiting greats, scattered participation benefiting non-greats, 
and great participation benefiting both state types. Predictably there are no cases in which the norm is 
participated in by only one state type and benefits only the other state type. One possible take away is that 
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when great states participate, UNGA participation seems to be lower. This, however; is already covered 
by table five. There also seems to be some relation between participation is more form non-greats and 
non-greats or both state types benefit which fits in well with my propositions. However, this is impossible 
to follow up without more cases and may not be an actual correlation because two of the cases with the 
least UNGA participation have scattered participation benefiting non-greats, and great participation 
benefiting both state types. The final table, below, combines all three factors which I believe influence 
UNGA involvement.  
Table 10 below shows the involvement of the UNGA in each case in relation to issue type, state(s) 
participating in the norm life cycle and state type(s) benefiting from the norm: 
Table 10:  








Security/Weapons         
(Human rights?) 
No China, Russia or US 
participation, 
Participation of middle 
states and non-greats 
Non-Great 
Organizational 





Great: Russia and US - 
No participation from: 
Angola, North Korea, 









Non-Great: India - 
Trouble from India and 
Pakistan little 
participation from US, 












POPs Environment Scattered Non-Great 
Organizational 
Foothold if Basel 
Convention included 
in life cycle 
Oil Pollution Environment 
Great: US/UK-- 








     This final table combines all three factors; issue type, participating state(s) and benefiting state(s). As 
seen from the previous tables the UNGA has the more participation in weapons cases and less in 
environmental cases overall. The UNGA also has more participation in norms which non-great powers 
are the primary participants. The final factor, benefiting state(s) seems to have less influence over all. 
However; there may be some influence because for the weapons norms the UNGA has the most influence 
in the norm that benefits both state types, which has more influence than the norm which benefits non-
greats, which has more influence than the norm which benefits greats. This fits well with the propositions 
made in this thesis. Although the same cannot be said for the environmental cases, if the oil pollution is 
mistyped as previously discussed then there is no conflicting information. Each of the three factors 
presented in these tables seems to have some influence on the role of the UNGA in the norm life cycle.  
Conclusions on Analysis: 
     Weapons and environmental issues clearly have many differences. However, both types of issues have 
been popular in terms of global norms and international legislation. Overall, the UNGA participated less 
and later when great states promoted the norm before the tipping point, and more and earlier if the norms 
were promoted by entities other than great states. Only in the chemical weapons case were great states the 
primary beneficiaries of the norm, in the other cases either both types of states or non-greats were targeted 
to be the primary benefactors. State participation was widely varied among cases. These results are 
promising but case selection could have been more rigorous, the interrelatedness of the Basel and 
Stockholm Conventions may be skewing the data, and more cases should be explored before accurate 
predictions may be made. 
          UNGA participation was evident in the organizational foothold phase of the life cycle of each norm 
except for the oil pollution norm, in which UNGA participation met none of the thresholds for 
participation. In the environmental cases the involvement of the UNGA was much more limited than with 
the weapons norms, participating in zero to two of the five life cycle phases as opposed to two to four 
phases in the weapons cases. It seems that the UNGA more often promotes issues which great states (and 
often non-greats also) have little or no desire to tackle. In these cases NGOs often also play a role and 
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may act as entrepreneurs for the norm life cycle. It is clear that UNGA participation is not necessary or 
sufficient for progression of the norm life cycle or norm success.  
     What has this study taught us about the role of UNGA participation in norm development? The 
expansion of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) life cycle emergence phase into separate entrepreneurship 
and organizational foot hold phases as well as designating the tipping point as an individual stage allowed 
for a more in-depth look at the norm life cycle. The timing and amount of UNGA participation does seem 
to be linked to the type of state benefiting from the norm. The analysis also indicates that the type of issue 
does not necessarily designate which types of state (great or non-great) will participate or who will 
promote the norm. These results may be helpful to policymakers looking to understand the importance of 
the role that the UNGA plays, and when that role is most dominant in the norm life cycle. This research 
helps gain understanding how norms are built and dispersed through international organizations such as 
the UNGA by looking at the institutional dimensions of norm development and making a case for where, 
when, and why the UNGA might play a role. I hoped to discover what roles the General Assembly plays 
in the norm life-cycle; it is clear that the UNGA may play important roles in the norm life cycle. This 
research has shown that the UNGA may be active and influential in all of the phases of the life cycle 
except for the entrepreneurship stage. These findings are exciting, since they show that the UNGA tends 
to be more involved in weapons norms, rather than environmental norms. This could reflect prioritization 
of weapons issues in the UNGA or there may be intervening variables. Though my propositions are not 
strong enough to be at predictive capacity it seems that UNGA participation is related to the issue type, 
type of benefiting states, and promoting states and/or bodies. This discovery can be but a small step in 
answering the age old question of international relations scholar’s; how does governance occur at the 
international level? 
Limitations and Future Research: 
     This research does not present a complete picture of the issues studied here. Although the results of the 
process tracing and analysis are promising, cases covering different issue areas would be beneficial in 
discerning the strength of the propositions for predictive purposes in determining the linkage of the role of 
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the UNGA and the factors studied here. Moreover, the study of more cases in the weapons and 
environmental areas would provide more clarity. Also, a more differentiated typology of states would 
probably prove beneficial and offer more understanding. The great/ non-great differentiation is concise in 
nature but misses nuances provided by separating states into more defined groups. 
     This research could have benefited from the use of more types of documents and informational 
sources. Future research could investigate sources such as memoirs of important participants, the review 
of UNGA minutes, court decisions resulting from international norm based legislation, public news 
accounts, and newsletters or memos from groups and companies affected by the legislation. Undertaking 
interviews of people involved in the norm life cycle, the UNGA, and other areas could also be valuable. 
This enterprise would be resource intensive but could provide a different level of insight into the process, 
as could discourse analysis which would provide information on how states view the importance of 
UNGA activities and the activities of other states when acting in these issue areas. The use of the different 
types of documents, interviews, and even other methods/approaches would provide higher validity and 
triangulation of results. Also the influence of other UN bodies, such as the UNEP could be undertaken 
when investigating areas specific to them i.e.; the environment.  
     This thesis has explored the role of the United Nations General Assembly in norm development and 
dispersal through the framework of the norm life cycle. Six cases in the weapons and environmental 
regimes were selected, representing a variety of issues and amounts of UNGA participation. These cases 
were then put through process tracing to discover the influence of issue type and state participation on 
UNGA involvement in each norm life cycle. Finally, an analysis was conducted and verdicts offered for 
the strength of my propositions. The analysis indicates that more research is needed to increase 
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